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ABSTRACT
Defining Reality: The Poverty and Welfare Rhetoric of 
Lyndon Johnson and Ronald Reagan
by
Andrea Lyn Finan
Dr. David Henry, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Communication 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This project examines the centrality of rhetorical definition in case studies of 
public argument over U.S. policy on poverty and welfare in the twentieth century. The 
starting point is research on presidential rhetoric, wherein one line of inquiry entails the 
exploration of the “bully pulpit” as an advantage to chief executives seeking to construct 
perceptions of social reality. Such construction frequently establishes the foundation of 
an incumbent’s persuasive strategies. Utilizing the poverty and welfare rhetoric of 
Lyndon Johnson and Ronald Reagan, this thesis argues that rhetorical definition was 
central to presidential rhetoric on these critical social controversies in the 1960s and 
1980s. In order to advance their proposals both presidents found it essential to provide 
definitions o f “the poor,” to delineate the government’s responsibilities to the 
disadvantaged, and to articulate the wisdom of their own policies in meeting those 
responsibilities. The analysis reveals that, in different ways, both presidents met with 
mixed success in matching the expectations they created through their discourse, with the 
realities achieved through their policies.
Ill
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION; DEFINITION AND 
PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC 
“Poverty in the midst o f  plenty is a paradox that must not go unchallenged in this 
country ” -John F. Kennedy
On January 8, 1964, during his first State o f the Union Address, President Lyndon 
B. Johnson declared an “unconditional war on poverty” (1964a 3). This war became the 
cornerstone o f his Great Society program and became synonymous with his plans for 
welfare reform. Seventeen years later. President Ronald Reagan came face-to-face with 
the national epidemic of poverty, coupled with rising economic turmoil. On February 18, 
1981, Reagan proposed drastic welfare reform, and assured the nation that the “truly 
needy” would always have their “safety net.”
This project assesses the poverty and welfare rhetoric of Presidents Johnson and 
Reagan. The analysis focuses on the significance o f presidential rhetoric in the twentieth 
century, the importance o f definition in the rhetorical practices of Johnson and Reagan, 
and how the definitions they advanced functioned as integral features o f their discourses 
on poverty and welfare. From Johnson’s War on Poverty to Reagan’s “safety net,” 
presidents have redefined poverty’s causes, effects, and victims. The definition of 
poverty changed with each new politician at the forefront of the discussion. Indeed,
1
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analysis o f public discourse about poverty reveals that definition is a central challenge to 
all who propose to understand, let alone solve, one o f American culture’s continuing 
social ills. In addition to the issue o f definition, central to this analysis is the increasing 
scope of presidential rhetoric and Americans’ continued faith in their leaders to provide 
accurate pictures o f reality concerning the far-less fortunate.
Poverty’s Place in Presidential Rhetoric 
In The Rhetorical Presidency, Jeffrey K. Tulis provides an overview of the 
concept of the power o f presidents to move publics. The scope and frequency of 
presidential speeches has significantly changed since the inception of the office in the 
late-eighteenth century. Tulis delineates this evolution, describing the types o f speeches 
typically delivered by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century presidents and juxtaposing 
them against modem presidential discourse: “Very few were domestic ‘policy speeches’ 
of the sort so common now, and attempts to move the nation by moral suasion in the 
absence o f war were almost unknown” (6). Although in the early twenty-first century, 
daily presidential discourse is commonplace, Americans were not always so receptive to 
frequent presidential address. Paul Haskell Zemicke, in his work Pitching the 
Presidency, offers an explanation for this gradual shift: “The rhetorical presidency of 
today is attributable to a conscious transformation in both the public and presidential 
perception of a president’s constitutional leadership” (23). The shift is due in part to 
presidents’ actively changing the role of the presidency and the public allowing them to 
do so.
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In the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries, what was considered 
appropriate presidential rhetoric differed markedly from what is eonsidered appropriate 
today. America’s founders supported the idea that “leaders should confine their speeches 
to celebrating the state and rededicating the nation to its most cherished principles. 
Rhetoric that exceeded this was deemed dangerous because it hindered deliberation and 
invited demagoguery” (Zemicke 23). According to James W. Ceaser, Glen E. Thurow, 
Jeffrey Tulis, and Joseph M. Bessette, authors of “The Rise o f the Rhetorical 
Presidency,” the only speech required of early American presidents was the State of the 
Union Address. Allowing presidents to discuss issues beyond ceremony or absolute 
necessity was not a major concem to the nation’s founders. “According to the Federalist 
Papers, the founding fathers believed that presidential orations should be limited to 
messages to Congress, addresses that endorsed republican principles, and relatively minor 
proclamations” (Zemicke 23). The study of presidential rhetoric expanded to include the 
changing organization o f the presidency.
The belief that presidents should limit their rhetoric was upheld through the 
nineteenth century. Richard Ellis observes, “In many nineteenth-century elections, 
presidential candidates barely uttered a word in their own behalf for fear they would be 
accused of unseemly ambition and demagoguery” (1). It was not until the twentieth 
century that it became acceptable for presidents to engage in other types of discourse. 
Beginning with Theodore Roosevelt, presidents began gradually to justify their 
discussions of other issues. Presidential rhetoric scholar David Michael Ryfe notes,
“since the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, each successive president has devoted 
more attention to [presidential communication] than the last” (1). Analysis of
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presidential discourse from the mid-twentieth century to the present reveals texts devoted 
to a variety o f topics—religion, poverty, war, illegal substances, and morality, any issue 
that is being discussed not only in the political realm but also the public realm. In the last 
one hundred years, “rhetoric has become both the entrance to and exit from the power of 
public opinion” (Zemicke 24).
Americans have become easily susceptible to presidential persuasion because they 
have grown accustomed to the chief executives’ attempts to change citizens’ attitudes. 
Unlike in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries, it is no longer unusual to hear 
presidential speeches. Ceaser et. al, state:
Popular or mass rhetoric, which Presidents once employed only rarely, now 
serves as one o f their principal tools in attempting to govem the nation. Whatever 
doubts Americans may now entertain about the limitations o f presidential 
leadership, they do not consider it unfitting or inappropriate for presidents to 
attempt to “move” the public by programmatic speeches that exhort and set forth 
grand and ennobling views (4).
This allowance enables presidents to forward their opinions on a wide range o f issues, 
frequently on controversial topics.
Understanding how presidents broaden their credibility to discuss such topics is 
important for Americans in general, and for communication scholars in particular. 
Zemicke explains that “as the most visible national leader, the President is the popular 
pulse of American politics. His prominence simplifies politics and govemment for 
many” (11). This awareness begins as early as elementary school. The president is 
typically the first figure in government that young students are exposed to, and the office
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becomes symbolic of the govemment as a whole. (Zemicke 10) Roderick Hart, 
distinguished scholar o f presidential rhetoric and Dean o f the College of Communication 
at the University of Texas, observes that modem Americans are used to seeing their 
presidents give speeches:
If asked to draw a freehand sketch o f their president, most modem Americans 
would begin with a podium. They would do so because the evening news they 
watch is largely designed to let them overhear their president. . .  because their 
own fondest memories o f their presidents are of moments oratorical—John 
Kennedy waming the Russians about certain missiles in Cuba; Lyndon Johnson 
imploring his fellow Southemers to grant voting rights to all Americans. (1)
Even the content of the speeches is no longer surprising. “We think nothing of the fact,” 
Ryfe writes, “that recent presidents have used parts of their State of the Union addresses 
to come out in favor of school uniforms and against the use of steroids in baseball” (1). 
Presidential rhetoric is not only increasing in terms of frequency, but also in the types of 
topics covered.
Americans often judge the effectiveness o f their presidents based on how often 
they hear from them. In The Sound o f  Leadership: Presidential Communication in the 
Modern Age, Hart argues that “public speech no longer attends the processes of 
govemance—it is govemance” (14). Moreover, he adds, “Americans have come to 
believe that govemance occurs only when their presidents talk to them” (15). This 
requirement for discourse allows contemporary presidents to talk about an expanded 
range o f subjects, and to do so more often than their predecessors. Americans are also 
more accepting of what their presidents speak about. Hart acknowledges the growing
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sphere of presidential rhetoric: “We find it quite natural, now, that a chief executive 
would be thoroughly familiar with tax law, scientifie breakthroughs, American history, 
and the ways o f the Lord” (11). Such topics would have been considered taboo or 
inappropriate for early American presidents but are now common place.
The public looks to the president for leadership on a wide range of issues, then, 
poverty and welfare reform among them. According to Zemicke, presidents are more 
than happy to comply, as presidential speeches increased 500% from 1945 to 1975. (21) 
An American president giving a speech on any topic is no longer the exception, but the 
rule. “By some estimates, presidents now spend almost one-third of their time appealing 
to the public via press conferences, speeches, and public appearances” (Zemicke 21). 
Presidential rhetoric must be carefully, continuously and critically analyzed, lest the fears 
of the founding fathers become a reality.
This study focuses on the increased scope and techniques of presidential rhetoric. 
The primary concem is with the strategies presidents use to advance an argument or 
champion a cause, with specific attention to the potential and limits o f definition as a 
persuasive tactic. In his article, “Presidential Rhetoric: Definition of a Discipline of 
Study,” rhetorical scholar Theodore Windt discusses a president’s resources for power. 
“The power upon which all other powers rest,” he argues, is “public opinion.” (xxiii). An 
adequate study of this resource must include, according to Windt, an “inquiry into a 
variety of other rhetorical weapons in his political arsenal that he uses to reach and 
persuade those in the public who either comprise his support, or pose opposition to him” 
(xxiii). By critically examining poverty and welfare rhetoric, a contribution can be made 
to the larger discussion o f presidential rhetoric. A closer look at the “rhetorical weapons”
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of Johnson and Reagan enhances the broader knowledge of the rhetorical strategies o f the 
presidency. Political science scholar Elmer E. Cornwell notes the value of such work 
when he writes that the president’s “prime weapon for influencing policy making is his 
ability to command and influence a national audience” (303). Through rhetoric, 
presidents present, advocate, or defend their arguments. Analyzing presidential rhetoric 
on poverty affords an opportunity to study the influence of such discourse in efforts to 
change the attitudes or beliefs o f audiences.
Defining Reality
Amos Kiewe, claims that modem presidents are “image makers. As such, they 
seek the opportunity to define situations and to constmct the reality they wish the public 
to accept” (xvi). To create and reinforce this reality, speakers seek to define what Ed 
Schiappa refers to as “facts o f essence” (6). Facts o f essence are concemed with 
discovering what something “is in reality” (6). Recently, politicians, presidents 
especially, have had to redefine facts o f essence, such as life and death. Schiappa 
observes that advances in medical technology have made defining death more 
complicated than in the past. It can be argued that life ends when a person stops 
breathing, their heart stops beating, or their brain stops functioning. The same can be 
said in the debate on defining life. Some interest groups argue that life begins at 
conception, others that life begins at various stages during the pregnaney. (Schiappa 37) 
In much the same way, presidents, through an increasingly rhetorical presidency, can 
redefine poverty to create a certain reality concerning what poverty is, whom it affects, 
and the gravity o f the problems it creates. The definition can take various forms. The
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definition can be framed to show that poverty is a national epidemic that can only be 
cured by immediate and forceful govemment intervention, as was championed by 
Johnson. Altematively, poverty can be defined to include only a small minority whose 
problem is easily manageable with little govemment interference, as will be seen in the 
analysis o f Reagan’s rhetoric.
If presidents can successfully restracture reality— by redefining “life” or “death,” 
“poverty” or “welfare”—they may leave a powerful legacy. At the very least, presidents 
can shape American discourse. As Zemicke observes, “studies of rhetoric confirm that at 
the very least a president can shape the language that Americans use to discuss and 
evaluate political issues” (4), subtly telling the American people not only what to think 
about, but how to think about it. Presidential discourse is no longer confined to issues of 
security, ceremony, or diplomacy, but now stretches to issues of morality and reality. 
Michael Foley observes o f the presidency in his essay, “Presidential Leadership and the 
Presidency,” that “the office may be in the process o f becoming a necessarily ideological 
agency whose power and authority are becoming increasingly dependent upon the 
mobilizing force o f national ideals, faiths and symbols” (47). As the office changes and 
evolves, the study o f presidential rhetoric must be expanded to provide useful and 
instmetive criticism.
Presidents often exploit the power o f definition to constmct a vision of reality for 
their constituents. Schiappa argues that “all definitions are political, specifically in two 
respects: first, definitions always serve particular interests; second, the only definitions of 
consequence are those that have been empowered through persuasion or coercion” (69). 
Schiappa endorses Thomas Kuhn’s contention that in “almost any arena of human
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interaction, the prevailing beliefs and interests o f those in authority will be defended even 
to the point o f dogmatism” (67). Americans must consider why they allow their 
presidents to engage in definitional rhetoric and be aware of the power involved with 
redefining life, death, or socioeconomic status. Rhetorical scholars must consider how 
that reality is constructed and how the public is persuaded to accept it.
It is not always obvious that politicians are engaging in the redefinition o f reality, 
as it is often under the guise o f typical policy making. Schiappa cites philosopher 
Douglas Walton, for example, to argue that it is “taken for granted that words, especially 
scientific terms and terms used in legal statutes and govemment regulations, have an 
objective meaning” (7). Speakers aspire to reshape the definition of poverty in order to fit 
the argumentative strategy they intend to employ. Speakers do this easily, because 
determining whether someone is a member o f the culture of poverty is not as easy as 
determining if someone is a man or a woman—there are no clear cut physical symptoms. 
Poverty is ambiguous, and this ambiguity can be used to the rhetorical advantage of the 
speaker.
Americans’ first attempts to define poverty came as early as the Revolutionary 
era. Sociologist John Iceland, author of Poverty in America: A Handbook, notes, “As far 
back as 1776, Adam Smith . . .  defined the lack o f ‘necessaries’ as the experience of 
being unable to consume ‘not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary 
for the support o f life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for 
creditable people, even o f the lowest order, to be without’”(11). But even this definition 
is far from precise or absolute. Jean Bethke Elshtain, writes in Real Politics: At the 
Center o f  Everyday Life, that, “words are often murky, ambiguous, concealing— not
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because some chicanery is afoot, nor because the language user is thinking sloppily, but 
because reality does not, most o f the time, lend itself to common sense representation” 
(55). Indeed, defining poverty is not a clear task with correct or incorrect quantitative 
answers. Presidents often take it upon themselves to change the ambiguous reality into a 
definite truth.
In attempting to define reality, presidents must often utilize what philosopher 
Charles L. Stevenson calls a persuasive definition. Stevenson explains in Ethics and 
Language that these definitions are employed “consciously or unconsciously, in an effort 
to secure . . .  a redirection of people’s attitudes” (210). In introducing persuasive 
definitions, Walton maintains that “popular opinions tend to take certain assumptions 
about definitions for granted without reflecting on them too deeply” (122). Because 
definitions are often taken for granted, it is the responsibility o f rhetorical scholars to lend 
a critical eye to the discourse. Constructing a reality involves not only advancing a 
definition, but persuading the audience to accept it. Chaim Perelman and Lucie 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, authors of A New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, assert that 
“a definition is always a matter o f choice. Anyone making such a choice, particularly if a 
dissociative definition is involved, will generally claim to have isolated the single, true 
meaning of the concept, or at least the only reasonable meaning or the only meaning 
corresponding to current usage” (448). It is here, at the intersection of reality and 
perceived reality, that criticism must begin.
Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson offer an explanation of the 
link between presidential rhetoric and the act of defining reality, when other politicians 
and critics discuss topics about which they are not qualified to speak. They observe that
10
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“only a president can issue a presidential inaugural and, in the process, become ‘the 
president’; only a president can issue a pardon and, in so doing, absolve a malefactor o f a 
federal crime; only a president can state objections to a piece of legislation and, thereby, 
mandate its reconsideration by Congress” (4). The American people are accustomed to 
presidents doing “special things,” things only they can do. This begins to explain why 
citizens are willing to accept presidential discourse on scientific, religious or moral 
controversies.
Poverty Rhetoric
If poverty and welfare are to be discussed productively, politicians must first 
supply a definition of poverty. Once that definition has been established, they must 
persuade the audience to accept it. In his frank discussion of stereotypes in the 1960s 
Michael Harrington notes the challenges this opportunity “to define” poses. He describes 
in The Other America the attitude of the average American toward the poor: “Here is the 
most familiar version of social blindness: ‘The poor are that way because they are afraid 
o f work. And anyway they all have big cars. If they were like me (or my father or my 
grandfather), they could pay their own way. But they prefer to live on the dole and cheat 
the taxpayers’” (14). Political scientist Murray Edelman puts it this way in Political 
Language: Words That Succeed and Policies That F a it “[W]e want to be reassured that 
‘Man is the captain of his fate’” (4). In the mid-twentieth century, Americans had 
distinct attitudes that the poor were in poverty because of some fatal flaw, laziness or the 
refusal to work hard. The middle and upper classes were convinced that stepping out of 
poverty was as simple as the old adage, o f “pulling yourself up by the boot straps.”
11
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David T. Ellwood, daim s in Poor Support: Poverty in the American Family that 
Americans think “people can escape poverty if only they use some elbow grease. The 
poor are those who lack the determination to make it” (7). Many Americans subscribed 
to the reality that poverty was something that happened other places, particularly in third 
world countries and destitute nations. Ben Bagdikian, in his book, In the Midst o f  Plenty: 
The Poor in America, contends that the 1960s notions o f poverty were taken for granted, 
that Americans’ assumptions of the poor allowed them to ignore the problem of poverty: 
We are not yet convinced that there is truly a world inside our society in which 
the American dream is dying, where when it rains at night everyone gets up to 
move beds away from the leaks. Where there is no electricity but discarded 
refrigerators are valued to keep food safe from rats. Where regularly in the last 
week of the month whole families live on things like berries and bread. (6) 
Instead, Bagdikian states, “we are inclined to think that this happens only to the physical 
and psychological cripples, that they suffer in small numbers in isolated geographic 
pockets” (7). These attitudes can be reinforced or disproved based on the politician’s 
effort to define or redefine poverty.
In Am erica’s Struggle against Poverty in the Twentieth Century, Foundation 
Professor of History emeritus at Brown University, James T. Patterson characterizes 
conservative opinion at the time Johnson declared a War on Poverty. “First, poor people 
deserved their fate. ‘The fact is,’ Goldwater said, ‘that most people who have no skill 
have had no education for the same reason— low intelligence or low ambition.’ In the 
United States, people are rewarded by ‘merit and not by fiat’” (140). This opinion was 
consistent with those of conservative pundits. “‘The only solution to poverty,’ wrote the
12
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conservative columnist Henry Hazlitt, ‘is free enterprise and continued economic 
growth—those things which made America great’” (140).
These attitudes continued to influenee popular opinion throughout Johnson’s 
term. “Most middle-class Americans,” Patterson asserts, “continued to stereotype the 
poor disparagingly and to recoil at the thought o f expanding welfare” (153). Johnson 
faced strong stereotypes connected to welfare as well. Patterson discusses a study done 
in 1965 that measured attitudes o f Americans toward welfare recipients. According to 
the report, “50 percent o f respondents favored denying relief to unwed mothers who had 
further illegitimate children; 20 percent favored sterilizing the mothers. The poll showed 
that 84 percent wanted (11 percent opposed) to require able-bodied people on relief to 
take ‘any job offered which pays the going wage’” (107).
These visions of poverty were not novel; their roots can be traced to the early 
American settlers. Even before America became a nation, settlers held distinct opinions 
about the impoverished among them. In the early seventeenth-century, poverty was 
considered not as a misfortune, but “as a vice, and unemployed men were often either 
bound out as indentured servants, whipped and forced out of town, or put in jail” (Iceland 
11). The only citizens exempt from such treatment were the elderly and children.
Iceland notes o f the early colonists, “rugged individualism was the idea, and able-bodied 
poor people were thought to be lazy and morally degenerate” (120). These fatally 
negative views of the impoverished continued through the eighteenth- and nineteenth- 
centuries. Patterson discusses Americans’ attitudes at the end of the nineteenth-century, 
when the poor were considered “lazy, apathetic, childlike and sensual” (20). The attitude
13
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towards welfare can be attributed to the “reality” associated with it. The stigma is the 
result of a construction of reality, and can be enforced or completely altered by rhetoric.
There was a backlash against this opinion in the early 1960s, due in part to the 
writings of Harrington and Bagdikian. Because o f these works, Patterson notes, “after 
many years of neglect, economists, sociologists, and anthropologists at last began to 
scrutinize poverty and to ask harder questions about its causes, effects, and cures” (97). 
Various political and public media covered the issue with renewed vigor. For example. 
Time magazine published an article on October 1, 1965, that offered a blunt discussion of 
prevailing poverty. The author concluded, “Invisible or not the poor are real.” Despite a 
dubious audience, the author then illustrated:
Fifteen o f them live in two rooms in one Atlanta building, where they cannot even 
make love in private. “I ain’t got no stove in the basement and I ain’t got no stove 
in the kitchen,” says a Harlem woman who lives in a building jammed with 
whores, rats and babies. “I ain’t got no paint and I ain’t got no windows and I 
ain’t got no providements. I keep the place clean just so the doctor can come in, 
and some day the undertaker. What’s a poor person? A poor person is when you 
see me!” (“The Poor” 4).
Even if the American audience could be persuaded through articles like this that 
the poor were present in the country, Patterson notes a more significant problem. “Most 
important,” he argues, “in the early 1960s Americans did not consider poverty and 
welfare urgent or deeply troubling problems. . . . The rediscovery of poverty occurred not 
in the trough of a depression, not at a time of social turmoil, but in the midst of the most 
sustained period o f economic well-being in national history” (108).
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In order to understand fully any rhetorical act, the rhetorical situation must be 
considered. Johnson and Reagan were presented with significantly different rhetorical 
situations. Johnson launched his War on Poverty in a time of perceived affluence, while 
Reagan championed his welfare reform in a time of national economic crisis. The 
rhetorical situations o f Johnson and Reagan in presenting their plans for welfare reform 
are examined in the following chapters.
Analytical Approach 
Presidential texts— speeches, statements, press conferences, etc— and the 
autobiographies by Johnson and Reagan provide the data for the criticism that follows. 
The need to define poverty, to provide its scope and limits, as seen above, was especially 
necessary in 1964 due to the sudden surge in attention to poverty. Given the influence of 
Johnson’s Great Society programs on poverty and welfare rhetoric, analysis begins with 
his declaration o f a War on Poverty. David Zarefsky highlights the political strategy 
involved in the pronouncement. He writes in President Johnson's War on Poverty^ that 
LBJ had to “safeguard and nurture the Kennedy legacy, in keeping with his role as 
executor o f the late president’s political will. But as president in his own right, he also 
needed to define himself as a leader separate and distinct from President Kennedy” (23). 
Johnson’s solution, Zarefsky continues, was to identify himself with “a program which 
Kennedy supporters might champion enthusiastically but which was not yet publicly 
labeled as a Kennedy effort” (23).
To initiate the analysis, Johnson’s “Annual Message to the Congress on the State 
of the Union: January 8, 1964” is examined. In this speech, Johnson declared an
15
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“unconditional war on poverty” (1964a 3). In The Persistence o f  Poverty in the United 
States, Garth L. Magnum, Stephen L. Magnum and Andrew M. Sum argue that Johnson 
had first to define poverty before outlining his plan to defeat it. (78) Initiating this 
process, Johnson first showed the severity o f the enemy, by defining some leading causes 
that contribute to the growing poverty problem. Johnson then defined his plan by 
outlining his strategy to win the war, including raising the quality o f teaching in the 
school systems, increasing the number o f workers eligible for the minimum wage, 
widening the food stamp program and providing more housing for the poor and elderly.
This speech illuminates Johnson’s attempts to redefine poverty in America. It 
was his first major attempt to provide a new definition in contrast to the prevailing 
assumptions about poverty. Declaring the war on poverty was not as simple as showing 
that a problem existed; Johnson also had to show the American people that this issue was 
a national concern. Zarefsky asserts that, “From the colonial period onward, the 
dominant belief was that poverty was an individual, not a social, problem” {President 
Johnson’s War 38). Johnson countered public preconceptions. “Poverty,” he argued, “is a 
national problem, requiring improved national organization and support. For the war 
against poverty will not be won here in Washington. It must be won in the field, in every 
private home, in every public office, from the courthouse to the White House” (1964a 3). 
Johnson acknowledged common assumptions that the poor are in their situation because 
of laziness or lack of ambition, but he offered an alternative view in his attempt to 
redefine poverty. He maintained, “Very often a lack of jobs and money is not the cause 
of poverty, but the symptom. The cause may lie deeper in our failure to give our fellow 
citizens a fair chance to develop their own capacities, in a lack of education and training,
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in a lack o f medical care and housing, in a lack o f decent communities in which to live 
and bring up their children”( 1964a 4). By offering a new cause for poverty, Johnson 
began to redefine reality to frame his War as the only appropriate solution.
Johnson also discussed the weapons that would help win the war on poverty: “Our 
chief weapons in a more pinpointed attack will be better schools, and better health, and 
better homes and better training, and better job opportunities to help more Americans, 
especially young Americans, escape from squalor and misery and unemployment rolls 
where other eitizens help to carry them” (1964a 3). Johnson’s introduction to the War 
Poverty, his description o f poverty’s causes, and his plan of “attack” make this an ideal 
speech to begin to analyze Johnson’s rhetorical attempts to redefine the reality o f poverty.
Though Johnson declared the War on Poverty in his initial State o f the Union 
Address there are other speeches that must be considered when analyzing this genre of 
his rhetoric. The speeches used here date from as early as December 4 1963, in his 
remarks at a meeting with the AFL-CIO Executive Council, and continue to his final 
State o f the Union Address in 1969. The audiences addressed in these speeches are 
diverse, including the participants in the Conference on Women in the War on Poverty, 
the Convention of the Communications Workers of America, and the Convention of the 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers.
Examination of Ronald Reagan’s rhetoric on welfare reform begins with analysis 
of his “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the Program for Economic 
Recovery.” Delivered February 18, 1981, this speech differs vastly in tone and substance 
from Johnson’s rhetoric. As American Studies scholar Alex Waddan notes, “Reagan had 
been opposed to the War on Poverty from its very conception,” even “well before there
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was enough material evidence for either praise or damnation” (125). In his 1981 speech, 
Reagan created a social reality describing the state o f économie affairs. He began by 
delineating the severity o f the situation, discussing rising inflation and high 
unemployment. After he painted a somber picture of the nation’s financial woes, he 
turned to his solutions, including budget cuts.
Reagan proposed cuts in direct Federal spending, yet acknowledged the fears of 
many people who depended on govemment aid. He assured them, “we will continue to 
fulfill the obligations that spring from our national conscience” (1981b 2). He began to 
outline his own definition o f poverty, and provided encouragement to those who were 
dependent on welfare. Those “who through no fault o f their own,” he said, “must depend 
on the rest of us—the poverty stricken, the disabled, the elderly, all those with tme 
need—can rest assured that the social safety net o f programs they depend on are exempt 
from any cuts” (1981b 2). Here, Reagan clearly defined his intentions for the fight 
against poverty. This was particularly strategic in that it seemed to promise relief from 
poverty but still allowed Reagan to be ambiguous about his plans. David Zarefsky, Carol 
Miller-Tutzauer, and Frank E Tutzauer, identify the rhetorical strategies employed by 
Reagan in this address. In “Reagan’s Safety Net for the Truly Needy: The Rhetorical 
Uses of Definition,” they argue that the “twin phrases, ‘safety net’ and ‘tmly needy,’ 
gave Ronald Reagan a valuable rhetorical foundation in 1981. They both sustained the 
faith of his own supporters and reassured his opponents that he was not going to destroy 
the true essentials of the social programs in which they believed” (115).
In this speech, Reagan listed several programs that would be exempt from cuts, 
seemingly in an effort to reassure Americans dependant on govemment aid. Such
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programs included Social Security; Medicare; supplemental income for the blind, aged 
and disabled; veterans’ pensions; school breakfasts and lunches for children of low 
income families, and Project Head Start. Although these programs would continue to 
receive funding, he stipulated their continued existence. He provided a clear redefinition 
and redirection of the Food Stamp program, for example; “The Food Stamp program will 
be restored to its original purpose, to assist those without resources to purchase sufficient 
nutritional food. We will, however, save $1.8 billion in fiscal year 1982 by removing 
from eligibility those who are not in real need or who are abusing the program”(1981b 3). 
He also limited other programs, stating his “intention to keep the school breakfast and 
lunch programs for those in true need. By cutting back on meals for children of families 
who can afford to pay, the savings will be $1.6 billion in the fiscal year 1982” (1981b 3).
In order to offer a complete analysis of Reagan’s poverty rhetoric, several other 
speeches are examined. As with Johnson’s speeches, the texts selected cover the span of 
his presidency. The February 18**’, 1981, address is the earliest speech studied, and the 
last is his “Remarks at the Annual Dinner of the Knights of Malta in New York, New 
York,” presented on January 13, 1989. The occasions for these speeches and those in 
between were diverse including a panel on welfare reform, a Republican fundraising 
dinner, and remarks for members o f the American Legislative Exchange Council.
Several reasons commend the choice of data examined. First, the texts studied to 
establish the foundation o f the analysis were both given early in the presidents’ terms, 
within the first two months. Second, the principal text is the first major speech dealing 
with the issue o f poverty. Finally, each speech offered an overview o f the presidents’
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plans for welfare reform. In order to discuss the plan, each president had first to redefine 
poverty for their audience, so that their reforms constituted viable solutions.
Conclusion
“Presidential rhetoric” Windt argues, “is only one of the powers available to the 
President, but in a democracy, it may well be the fundamental power upon which all 
others rest” (xxiii). Poverty is an exemplary case to examine when considering the power 
of presidential rhetorie, for an expanded analysis of such discourse can illuminate the 
strategies politicians use to create and advance a specific definition of reality. Although 
the amount of research on presidential rhetoric is not meager, there are still questions to 
be explored. In an era in which the frequency of presidential speeches has increased, the 
need for careful scrutiny may never have been greater. Tulis states, “The rhetorical 
presidency may have been generally ignored as an object of concern not only because it 
has become so familiar and comfortably democratic, but also because it is hard to believe 
that mere rhetoric could be of consequence to the development of American institutions” 
(13). It is this assumption of “mere rhetoric” that the study of presidential rhetoric 
ultimately challenges.
John Iceland contends that our discussions of poverty contribute to its continued 
redefinition in America. “The persistence o f poverty in the United States reflects more 
than just an aggregation of individual failings. Structural factors, such as the way we 
understand and define poverty . . . shape current trends” (2). If for no other reason, it is 
important to understand the poverty problem in terms of its adverse effects on the 
American economy. Iceland maintains that “Declining levels of poverty contribute to a
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healthy economy by increasing the number o f people who can purchase goods and 
services; that increase, in turn, stimulates economic growth and raises average standards 
o f living” (3). More importantly, poverty rhetoric must be analyzed further, as the fight 
against poverty is far from over. Garth L. Magnum, Stephen L. Magnum, and Andrew 
M. Sum observe that now, forty years after Johnson declared war, “that nation still has 
not won that war”; in fact, “there are more poor people and poor families in the United 
States today than in the 1960s” (1). The issue o f poverty and welfare rhetoric continues 
to remain salient as politicians face the problem now and in the foreseeable future. 
Leaders’ efforts to define the problem, identify potential solutions, and characterize 
proposed initiatives thus merit close attention.
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CHAPTER TWO
JOHNSON’S RHETORICAL CONSTRUCTION 
OF POVERTY
On January 8, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson declared war. In his first State 
of the Union speech, he announced an absolute and total war against an enemy that had 
plagued Americans for generations. Johnson eommitted federal, regional, and personal 
resources to fighting this deadly enemy. Johnson pledged in his speech that his 
“administration today, here and now, declares an unconditional war on poverty in 
America” (1964a 2). Despite much debate about the success o f the War on Poverty, its 
rhetorical significance is unquestioned.
Though much critical attention has been paid to the rhetorical strategies of 
Johnson, most o f the focus has been on his use of the war metaphor. This project seeks to 
go beyond those analyses, to dissect the additional rhetorical strategies Johnson utilized 
to promote his War on Poverty. Though Johnson frequently weaves the war metaphor in 
and out of his discourse, he punctuates this effort with several other rhetorieal strategies. 
First, Johnson took advantage o f the rediscovery of poverty in the early 1960s to gain 
support for his initiatives, and used the newfound presence o f the topic to redefine 
poverty and welfare for his audience. Second, Johnson stressed the importance of 
government intervention, specifically a strong central government supporting local 
efforts, with the end result being tangible benefits for all Americans. Third, the president
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used stories of children to appeal to audience members whose stereotypes of the poor 
made them reluctant to help impoverished adults. Finally, Johnson referenced classic 
American values in an effort to link the War on Poverty to images of American victory.
The Rediscovery o f Poverty: American 
Attitudes of the Early 1960s 
Johnson utilized the popular discussions o f the early 1960s to advance the War on 
Poverty. The early years of the decade saw a popular rediscovery of the perils of poverty. 
Influential books including Michael Harrington’s The Other America and Ben 
Bagdikian’s In the Midst o f  Plenty: The Poor in America, brought poverty to the forefront 
of popular consciousness. Harrington has been credited as the man who “discovered” 
poverty, therefore proving the significance of these works. This period saw a surge in the 
attention that poverty programs and welfare reforms received. As historian James T. 
Patterson argues, “It is much easier to observe that poverty became a subject o f debate 
than to explain why. Destitution was nothing new, as America’s 39 million poor people 
(by official definition) in 1960 could attest” (98). Nevertheless, writers and political 
activists took advantage of this attention to further the cause o f the poor. Johnson also 
used the popularity o f these “new” ideas to promote the War on Poverty. It has been 
reported that Johnson read Harrington’s book, and The Other America has been credited 
with influencing policy making in the Johnson administration.
Because of the new literature, Americans were introduced to different views and 
explanations for the causes of poverty. In an effort to change the direction of public 
attitudes, Harrington introduced the concept of the culture of poverty, which he theorized
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was a vicious cycle. He argued that the poor were not a group of lazy people who 
refused to leave their substandard conditions; rather, they were a community caught in an 
unbreakable rotation o f despair. Harrington explained the cycle, beginning with the fact 
that within the culture o f poverty, the poor are sick more than any other group.
Harrington attributed this to substandard conditions, lack of proper nutrition, inadequate 
medical care, and unhygienic conditions. Once they become sick, they remain sick 
longer than any other group due to the same reasons they become sick in the first place. 
Their sickness results in lost “wages and work, and [they] find it difficult to hold a steady 
job. And because o f this, they cannot pay for good housing, for a nutritious diet, for 
doctors” (15). Thus, the cycle is perpetuated.
This idea o f poverty as a continuous cycle was a novel one, and Johnson used it 
frequently to describe the desperate situation of the poor. In his first State of the Union 
address, for instance, he initially declared, “very often a lack o f jobs and money is not the 
cause of poverty, but the symptom. The cause may lie deeper in our failure to give our 
fellow citizens a fair chance to develop their own capacities, in a lack of education and 
training, in a lack of medical care and housing, in a lack of decent communities in which 
to live and bring up their children” (1964a 2). He began to create a reality for the 
American people in which the impoverished are often helpless and have no recourse. 
Johnson constructed a world where poverty was not the result of an indolent individual 
with no drive or motivation to be successful. It was instead the mere lack o f resources for 
Americans longing to belong to a “decent community”. Rhetorical scholar David 
Zarefsky notes, “To choose a definition is, in effect, to plead a cause, as if  one were 
advancing a claim and offering support for it” (“Presidential Rhetoric” 612). By using
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Harrington’s theories as the basis for his definition of poverty, Johnson constructed an 
argument, laying the foundation by defining poverty as a devastating cycle. This was not 
merely an attempt to elicit sympathy from his audience but was the president making a 
direct claim regarding the reality o f poverty in the United States.
Months later, Johnson described to the United States Congress situations similar 
to those examined by Harrington, in which a “young man or woman who grows up 
without a decent education, in a broken home, in a hostile and squalid environment, in ill 
health or in the face of racial injustice-that young man or woman is often trapped in a life 
of poverty” (1964d 1). Again, this was not only an attempt to paint a picture for his 
audience, it was direct reinforcement of his initial definition. Johnson emphasized the 
destructive circumstance as a trap and he stressed the importance of breaking the cycle. 
“The vicious circle of poverty— in which one generation’s poverty, ignorance, and 
disease bred the same problems for the next— must be broken” (1964c 6). Here Johnson 
definitively stated that if  the problem of poverty were not eradicated, it would only 
continue its deadly cycle. The president emphasized the writings of authors like 
Harrington and Bagdikian by stressing the hopelessness of many of America’s poor. He 
defined poverty as a central element of an unfortunate circumstance, not the deliberate 
choice of lazy or unambitious citizens. “Yet for 31 million Americans,” Johnson 
declared, “poverty is neither remote in time, nor removed in space. It is cruel and present 
reality. It makes choices for them. It determines their future prospects— despite our hope 
and belief that in America, opportunity has no bounds for any man” (1967cl4). He used 
his position to widen the distribution of these ideals, and developed them to argue for an
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all out war on poverty. By postulating the idea o f poverty as a eyele, Johnson began to 
redefine poverty for his audience.
Johnson defined the reality of poverty, and therefore set the terms o f the debate 
for his audience, by endorsing Harrington’s theory. “Because of his prominent political 
position,” Zarefsky argues, “and his access to the means of communication, the president, 
by defining a situation, might be able to shape the contest in which events or proposals 
are viewed by the public” (“Presidential Rhetoric” 611). Johnson utilized the unique 
situation of the presidency to forward the definition of poverty that would best support 
his initiatives. Johnson stated, “Poverty defies simple description. It is a cycle which 
begins with an infancy o f deprivation, continues in a youth o f hopelessness, extends to a 
jobless adulthood, and finally ends— for those who survive—in a bleak and despairing 
old age. At every stage, the conditions of life are poor housing, inadequate education and 
training, deficient health care, and often, gnawing hunger” (1967d 1). Such bleak 
descriptions illustrated that poverty was a cycle that influenced Americans o f all ages and 
backgrounds. Johnson was careful to show poverty’s range, and its lack of 
discrimination for race or region, emphasizing a key argument in the poverty literature of 
the early 1960s. These ideas are advanced as assertions without the possibility of a 
contrary opinion. Johnson framed this definition as fact, as an accurate depiction of 
reality. “The presidential definition” Zarefsky explains, “is stipulated, offered as if  [it] 
were natural and uncontroversial rather than chosen and contestable” (“Presidential 
Rhetoric” 612). If this definition were accepted, it was more likely that Jolmson’s War 
on Poverty would seem an appropriate solution.
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Several years after declaring the War on Poverty, Johnson still referenced the 
nondi scriminatory nature o f the enemy o f poverty. He observed, for instance, that 
poverty
wears different masks in different places. We think of it as a city disease. But 
almost half o f American poverty is found in our rural areas. We sometimes may 
think o f it as a Negro affliction, but seven in ten poor people are white. Poverty 
afflicts the old man and it affects the young child. Poverty is found on an Indiein 
reservation, in the hollows of West Virginia, in the migrant camps of Oregon, and 
here, in Washington D.C., as well as throughout my State (1967b 3).
These descriptions comprised an attempt to change the definition of poverty as localized 
in economically depressed areas like “slums” or “ghettos.” Johnson cast the problem as a 
national epidemic by showing poverty’s pervasive nature. He argued in a speech in New 
York City, for example, that “poverty stalks not only in the hills and the valleys of 
Appalachia. It is here today. It is here in this city on all sides of the track right around 
where you live. It is the widow around the comer barely surviving on a pension of $70 a 
month. It is the teenager down the block unprepared by schooling and unwanted by an 
employer. It is the retired factory worker, sick o f body and tired of soul, depending on 
charity for his medical needs” (1964j 2). By showing the breadth of poverty’s 
devastating effects, Johnson reinforced poverty as a viable and dangerous enemy. This 
redefinition was necessary as not all Americans were convinced of the severity of the 
poverty problem. As Communication scholar Robert Asen explains, “the sociopolitical 
context in which [the president] declared war suggested a forming but not yet formed 
public view that poverty presented a grave national problem” (53). Therefore, Johnson
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constantly returned to Harrington’s theories within his own definitions of poverty. 
Harrington’s emphasis on poverty as a cycle, coupled with Johnson’s declarations of 
poverty as a national problem, became the cornerstone o f the reality that Johnson 
advanced throughout his presidential rhetoric.
Several of the books about poverty in the early 1960s responded directly to John 
Kenneth Galbraith’s The Affluent Society. Galbraith wrote that at the end of the 1950s, 
“in the United States, there has been great and quite unprecedented affluence” (1). He 
described an America free from the poverty that plagued other nations. He justified this 
reality by stating that, “One would not expect that the preoccupations of a poverty-ridden 
world would be relevant in one where the ordinary individual has access to amenities— 
foods, entertainment, personal transportation, and plumbing— in which not even the rich 
rejoiced a century ago” (2). Galbraith described a sort o f “case poverty” that included 
“the poor farm family with the junk-filled yard and the dirty children playing in the bare 
dirt” (325). Galbraith’s opinion was a popular one. Indeed, his book received critical 
acclaim and spent months on the best-seller list when it was released in 1958.
Galbraith attributed case poverty to the inadequacies of the individual. “Case 
poverty” he argued, “is commonly and properly related to some characteristic of the 
individuals so afflicted. Nearly everyone else has mastered his environment..  . but some 
quality peculiar to the individual or family involved— mental deficiency, bad health, 
inability to adapt to the discipline of life, uncontrollable procreation, alcohol, some 
educational handicap unrelated to community shortcoming, or perhaps a combination of 
several of these handicaps—has kept these individuals from participating in the general 
well-being” (325). In the second edition o f his book, he labeled the population of case
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poverty as “worthless and, as a simple manifestation o f social justice, they suffer for it” 
(288). Harrington and Bagdikian sought to contradict these descriptions o f the poor in 
the early 1960s. Further, it was stereotypes similar to these that constructed the reality 
for Americans that Johnson attempted to change.
Much o f Johnson’s War on Poverty rhetoric reflected this dramatic dichotomy.
He drew directly from Bagdikian’s influential book: “There is too much poverty in the 
midst of plenty; while our cup is running over, more than 30 million Americans have not 
tasted its contents” (1964h 1). Johnson discussed the issue directly, comparing the 
members of the affluent society to the poor in America, in a fashion similar to the styles 
of Bagdikian and Harrington. He contended in the annual budget message to Congress , 
“In a nation as rich and productive as ours, we cannot tolerate a situation in which 
millions of Americans do not have the education, health, and job opportunities for a 
decent and respected place as productive citizens” (1964c 6). He utilized the assumptions 
of the affluent society and shifted them to redefine the reality of poverty. The president 
countered the notions that poverty was not something that happened in America. In 
defining what poverty meant to impoverished Americans, he lamented:
It means waiting in a surplus food line rather than in a supermarket check-out. It 
means going without running water rather than worrying about whether you can 
afford a color television. It means despairing of finding work rather than 
wondering when you can take your vacation. It means coming home each night 
empty-handed to look at the expectant faces of your little children who lack the 
things that they need. It means a lonely battle to maintain pride and self-respect 
in a family that you cannot provide for—not because you don’t want to and not
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because you don’t try to, but in a Nation where so many seem to be doing so well 
you seem to be finding it difficult (19641 2)
These remarks at Cumberland, Maryland City Hall demonstrated the amalgamation of the 
above mentioned strategies. Here poverty was clearly outlined as a real element of 
American society, one that was nation-wide and that affected many different types of 
people. This strategy sought to jar the members o f the affluent society out of their pieture 
perfect realities into Johnson’s reality where poverty is a cycle, and its perpetuation is 
unavoidable.
Johnson also used the strategy o f identification to appeal to the affluent. Kenneth 
Burke describes an element of identification that rests on the ability of the persuader to 
convince the audienee that, though different, the interests of the audienee and persuader 
are joined. Burke writes, “A is not identical with his [sic] colleague, B. But insofar as 
their interests are joined, A is identified with B. Or he may identify himself with B even 
when their interests are not joined, if  he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe 
so” (20). Part of Johnson’s rhetoric had to appeal to the members o f the upper and 
middle classes, to convinee them that their support was necessary. The prineiple of 
identification helps to explain how he sought to unite a diverse American audience with 
the members o f the culture of poverty, and against their eommon enemy.
Communication scholars Edward D. Steele and W. Charles Redding offer insight 
into a part o f the American ego. “Although the American is notoriously competitive,” 
they note, “it is also true that the idea of cooperation as a means to mutually desired ends 
has been reinforced since the days of frontier living” (85). Johnson played upon this idea 
when he declared: “That the ancient enemy of poverty should thrive and fatten in this
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abundant land is a vile and shameful thing. The tax eut is our modem weapon today 
against unemployment which breeds poverty and ignorance, the inconsiderate allies of 
apathy and neglect” (1963 2). This strategy created a clear line o f division between the 
war’s supporters and the opposition.
Once Johnson defined a line, his audience was forced to choose sides. One side—  
that dedicated to winning the War on Poverty— was explicitly more desirable. The other 
side only fueled the enemy’s fire by supporting “poverty and ignoranee, the inconsiderate 
allies o f apathy and neglect.” In describing the perils of poverty, Johnson also attributed 
such qualities to those who opposed his proposed poliey while dissociating them from the 
War on Poverty’s supporters. For example, shortly after he declared the War on Poverty 
Johnson said, “If we are to live with pride in a world of decency, we must commit 
ourselves to removing from the earth the scars and scourge of human poverty and disease 
and ignorance and intolerance” (1964b 1). The “A” group in Burke’s definition and the 
“B” group—though perhaps differentiated by a multitude of characteristics including 
political party, class, race, or gender— are now united, or at least persuaded to believe 
that their interests are joined. The next goal was to eliminate “poverty,” “disease,” 
“ignorance,” and “intolerance.” Johnson depicted this unified group as decent, 
knowledgeable, and courageous. Social psychologist Michael Billig contends that 
“political orators should argue that the particular policy, which they are advocating, 
would enhance the general morality that they all share. In doing this, the politicians will 
be rhetorically identifying with the audience and will also be promoting their own ethos 
as someone who values what the audience values” (233). This idea is further informed
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by Burke’s principle o f identification, as Johnson attempted to include himself and his 
administration with the “decent, knowledgeable, and courageous.”
Government Intervention: Johnson’s 
Rhetorical Command Center 
After defining poverty as a viable enemy and emphasizing that it was widespread 
and thriving, Johnson argued that defeating poverty constituted a challenge to the entire 
nation. If poverty were eoncentrated in seleet or geographieally isolated areas, then the 
argument might be made that state and local agencies were better suited to handle the 
problem. Instead, Johnson contended, poverty’s national prominence made it a problem 
for the federal government.
A defining element of Johnson’s anti-poverty rhetoric was his articulation of the 
government’s central role in solving the problem. In contrast to Ronald Reagan, who 
focused on the responsibilities of state governments, Johnson shifted responsibility to the 
federal level. He did not, though, discount the importance o f local and individual efforts. 
It was in this delicate balance, Johnson maintained, that victory might be secured. He 
stated, “Our strategy against poverty relies on: the private initiative of every citizen and 
on the self-help efforts o f the poor themselves. The resources of city, county, state and 
metropolitan agencies. Federal programs to supplement private and local activities and 
often to supply the vital thrust o f innovation” (1967c 2). In his initial declaration of the 
war, Johnson stressed the importance of local efforts: “For the war against poverty will 
not be won here in Washington. It must be won in the field, in every private home, in 
every public office, from the courthouse to the White House” (1964a2). While stressing
32
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the importance o f government intervention, however, Johnson also made individual 
citizens responsible for change. “I propose,” he stated, “a program which relies upon the 
traditional and time-tested American methods of organized local community action to 
help individuals, families, and communities to help themselves” (1964c 6). This strategy 
allowed the president to emphasize the shared responsibility of both the government and 
the individual in fighting the War on Poverty, while stressing the importance of a strong 
backing by the centralized government.
It is here that Johnson began to enlist Americans into his War on Poverty. If 
poverty were to be a national war, then it must also be a national victory. The 
responsibility o f individuals resonated loudly with his audience, a generation of 
Americans who had lived through World War II and the Great Depression. Their 
experiences rendered them more sympathetic to the plight of the poor. The life 
experiences o f Johnson’s audience contrasted sharply with the generations Reagan 
addressed. The audience of the 1980s was widely removed from the economic and 
national struggles o f the previous generation; the 1980s, in fact, was eventually labeled 
the “me generation.” But in the 1960s, the commitment to individual humanitarianism 
based on shared history, coupled with a belief in active government, allowed Johnson to 
promote federal policy as a remedy to the challenges faced by the poor.
In arguing that the federal government must intervene to eliminate poverty, 
Johnson also had to reconstruct the reality of government for his audience. Alex Waddan, 
Lecturer in American Politics and American Foreign Policy at the University of 
Leicester, maintains that “Johnson explicitly sought to belie distrust of federal 
government action in arguing that the state was not something to be feared, but was a
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potentially benevolent force whose resources needed to be utilized accordingly” (51). He 
continues: “Thus, when Johnson launehed the War on Poverty it was with the assumption 
that government had a eentral role to play in expanding the general affluence of 
American society so that all could enjoy it” (51). His deseriptions o f the government’s 
efforts were usually coupled with praise o f local and individual efforts. “But whatever 
the cause,” Johnson declared during this first State o f the Union address, “our joint 
Federal-local effort must pursue poverty, pursue it wherever it exists— in city slums and 
small towns, in sharecropper shaeks or in migrant worker eamps, on Indian Reservations, 
among whites as well as Negroes, among the young as well as the aged, in the boom 
towns and in the depressed areas” (1964a 2). Johnson joined familiar and unfamiliar, 
large and small together to create a reality of a federal government with a familial 
relationship to its citizens. Placing responsibility on the federal government allowed the 
war to have a “command center,” a focal point, and emphasized the “war” as a serious 
one.
In his rhetoric, Johnson sought to assure Americans skeptical o f government 
intervention that the focus o f the War on Poverty would be to help people out of their 
impoverished states, not to provide a temporary solution that might ultimately keep them 
there. “We strive for this goal by attacking the causes of poverty,” he declared, “and we 
are not trying to give people more relief—we want to give people more opportunity” 
(1964i). Here, the goal o f Johnson’s construction of reality was to provide a new 
definition designed to overcome the stigma o f welfare. As discussed earlier there were 
clear stereotypes in the early 1960s concerning the poor and the government’s attempts to 
help them. As political scientist Murray Edelman put it, “The world ‘welfare’ evokes an
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image o f a drain upon the community’s tax revenues and of chiselers who do not like to 
work” (13). To combat such images, Johnson had to make it clear that the War on 
Poverty would not only supply Americans with the proverbial fish; instead, the programs 
to be implemented were designed to provide the poor with the skills needed to break the 
vicious cycle o f poverty. He stated, “The war on poverty is not a struggle simply to 
support people, to make them dependent on the generosity of others. It is a struggle to 
give people a ehance” (I964d I). Johnson focused his rhetoric by showing that the War 
on Poverty would provide the neeessary tools, or ammunition, neeessary to defeat this 
destructive enemy. He assured his audience that the administration’s programs would 
provide lasting solutions for America’s poor. “Our American answer to poverty is not to 
make the poor more secure in their poverty but to reach down and help them lift 
themselves out of the ruts of poverty and move with the large majority along the high 
road of hope and prosperity” (1964n 2). Johnson framed the War on Poverty not as a 
temporary solution to a nuisance, but as a permanent solution to a devastating problem.
Johnson spent considerable time assuring the average American, more specifically 
the taxpayers, that their money would not be wasted. Bruce J. Schulman, Professor of 
history at Boston University and author o f Lyndon B. Johnson and American Liberalism, 
observes that, “Waging an all-out ‘war on poverty’ entailed serious political risks; it had 
little appeal for the business community and the well-to-do, who worried about the costs 
of such a battle” (75). Addressing such worries, Johnson explained that
[tjhese programs are obviously not for the poor or the underprivileged alone. 
Every American will benefit by the extension of social security to cover the 
hospital costs o f their aged parents. Every American community will benefit
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from the construction or modernization of schools, libraries, hospitals, and 
nursing homes, from the training o f more nurses and from the improvement of 
urban renewal in public transit. And every individual American taxpayer and 
every corporate taxpayer will benefit from the earliest possible passage of the 
pending tax bill from both the new investment it will bring and the new jobs that 
it will create (1964a 3)
The president demonstrated how even Americans not affected by the culture of poverty 
would benefit from proposed initiatives. He eited the members and values of the all- 
important 1960s nuclear family— young children, aging parents, and members of 
suburbia. Johnson illustrated how the support o f the food stamp program constituted a 
useful and effective way to help the poor help themselves. He then made it clear how the 
American economy and, as a consequence, countless Americans would benefit:
This kind o f progress all over the country makes the food stamp program a vital 
part of our work to break the cycle o f poverty among our less fortunate citizens. 
They have a chance to help themselves by investing their own money in food 
coupons worth more than they paid. The coupons are spent like cash at 
authorized food stores. Experience and research shows that farmers sell more 
food, grocers get more business, and the entire economy of the area gets a boost 
from the added food buying power o f food stamp customers (1965d 1).
Defeating this enemy, Johnson argued, would not only improve the quality of life of 
America’s impoverished, but of all Americans.
He also appealed to the believers in the affluent society while reinforcing the 
economic values o f the American financial system. “I believe we can and we should be
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proud that it is our free society— and our system of responsible capitalism—which is first 
able and willing to make a credible commitment to eradicate poverty among its own 
people” (1964m 1). In doing so, Johnson sought to create a clear link between the merits 
of his War on Poverty programs and the capitalist system Americans were feverishly 
trying to protect in the midst of the Cold War. Johnson praised the importance of a 
capitalist system as an integral part of the War on Poverty’s success. “A thriving national 
economy,” he observed, “is critical to our anti-poverty effort. Through a private initiative 
and wise économie policy, our economy is meeting its fundamental test of producing 
revenue and employment” (1967c 8). Johnson attempted to pacify his audience by 
striking a delicate balance between the importance of a flourishing capitalist society and a 
federal government dedicated to providing aid to the less fortunate.
Children o f Poverty: Johnson 
Defines Another Victim 
President Johnson used stories of young children in an effort to gain a 
sympathetic audience for the War on Poverty. A careful examination of the discourse 
shows a repeated narrative, one in which anonymous families encounter similar, adverse 
financial situations. The geographical places he referenced and the exact numbers varied, 
but the message recurred. Johnson talked about the “fathers who have 11 children and 
have only $20 on which to support them” (1964g 3) in an address to the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce. Many similar stories surfaced around the same time in 1964, only months 
after Johnson declared the war on poverty. At times he made his stories more specific, 
such as an address he delivered at the airport in Huntington, West Virginia, describing his
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visit. “Today I saw a father with 11 children who had worked 4 days last month. I saw 
another father with 8 children who had worked only 5 days last month” (1964e 1). In 
another speech a few days later, the sentiment was the same though the numbers had 
changed. Johnson stated, “One man with 11 children told me that he had 4 days’ work 
last month at $4 a day, not because he does not want work but because it is not there” 
(1964g 3). In these stories o f despair Johnson reinforced Americans’ responsibilities to 
these desperate families. He emphasized the children involved in these narratives, 
describing the group most influenced by the helplessness that poverty bestows. The 
public might resist depictions o f helplessness among the adult poor, but surely it was 
more difficult to argue against proposals that would reduce the vulnerability of 
impoverished children.
The inspiration for Johnson’s empathy for children, and for the strategic treatment 
of children’s welfare in his argument, can be traced to his own experiences as a young 
man. Early in his college career, he took a job in Cotulla, Texas, to earn money to 
continue his education. Even though he had not yet earned his college degree, he was 
hired as both a teacher and a principal for the Welhausen Ward Elementary School, a 
“drab and dingy all-Mexican school in the poorest pat of Cotulla” (Schulman 9). While 
he was there, Johnson observed the effects o f poverty first-hand. Schulman explains, 
“There was no lunch hour in Welhausen; the hungry pupils had no lunch to eat” (9). At 
the age of 20, Johnson began to fight against poverty. He worked to provide supplies and 
equipment for his students, and he stressed the importance of learning English.
Schulman notes that Johnson also organized transportation to ensure that his students
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could attend class. LBJ’s experience with impoverished children provided a clear point 
o f reference in his empathy for poverty’s victims.
Although Johnson provided his audience with moments o f light in the midst of 
poverty’s darkness, he carefully kept the initial emotional appeal at the forefront of his 
message. In his remarks to the members of the International Labor Press Association, 
Johnson recalled.
When I came out of Kentucky and Pennsylvania with unemployed steelworkers 
and auto workers in South Bend, Ind., and coal workers in West Virginia and 
eastern Kentucky, the thing that impressed me more than anything else was not 
just the dire poverty that I saw where a man had an income of less than $400 last 
year, with 8 children to raise, but the faith and hope that man had in the ultimate 
outcome of his whole situation in this country (1964f 3).
This story placed a heavy responsibility on the American people to ensure a victorious 
war on poverty. Johnson showed that in addition to the life of the man in the story, the 
lives of eight children depended on a successful effort.
The president employed a jolting story o f perceptions to describe the life of 
children in poverty. While addressing the delegates to the conference of State 
Commissions on the Status of Women he explained, “Recently, some underprivileged 
children in a Head Start project in Massachusetts were given a vocabulary test. The 
teacher held up flash cards of various objects to see if  they could identify them. One of 
these cards was the picture of a teddy bear. More than 60 percent of the children 
identified it as a rat. Their world, evidently, had more rats in it than teddy bears” (1966 
2). Johnson conjured up a familiar childhood memory for many adults, and used the
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blissful musings o f childhood to convey a darker reality for America’s poor. He 
continued to use such narratives as a further means o f elieiting sympathy. In a 
partieularly heart-wrenching story, Johnson strategically used a helpless child to convey 
poverty’s devastation on the Ameriean family. He said, “One of the finest women that I 
ever knew, a social worker, told me that she had called on a family at a mealtime not long 
ago. She told me the surroundings were meager. During the mealtime she noticed one of 
the many small children who was not eating. When she asked the child why, the answer 
was, ‘It is not my day to eat.’” (1964e 3). Johnson did not stop his argument with 
emotional appeal; instead, he also reminded audiences of their moral obligation to help 
these children and others like them. In doing so, he reinforced a reality for his audience 
that went beyond Galbraith’s “case poverty,” and other similar stereotypes, and 
showcased stories o f American families caught in poverty’s deadly cycle.
In addition to emotional appeals involving children, Johnson used America’s 
youth as a motivator for endorsing the War on Poverty. He utilized this strategy to 
highlight a special segment o f the poverty population in order to make the issue more 
difficult to ignore. This allowed him to use a different avenue in hopes o f soliciting 
support from the members o f the upper and middle class who were skeptical o f the 
“eulture o f poverty” theory. Given the perceptions o f poverty in the early 1960s, as 
discussed earlier, it was not often easy to arouse sympathy for the poor as a group. As 
Patterson notes in his analysis of popular sentiment in the 1960s, as “late as March 1964, 
when President Johnson called for a ‘war on poverty,’ a Gallup Poll showed that 83 
percent o f Americans thought poverty would never be done away with in the United 
States” (129).
40
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Poverty was perceived as a lost cause, not worthy of significant government funds 
or intervention. It was associated with laziness and lack of ambition, and it was therefore 
difficult to generate sympathy for the poor. To combat the stereotypes, Johnson focused 
part o f his rhetoric on children who suffered. If Americans could not be persuaded to act 
on behalf of adults in need, Johnson offered an alternative—the chanee to help 
impoverished youth. He painted these efforts as an obligation, as a core value of 
Ameriean ethics—helping those who cannot help themselves. In a message to Congress 
Johnson implored, “We owe to every young person in America a fair start in life— and 
this means that we must attack those deficiencies in education, training, health, and job 
opportunities by which the fetters of poverty are passed on from parents to children. The 
attack on poverty must be mobilized to support these efforts” (1964c 1). He extended 
this argument by appealing to his audiences’ sense o f duty, layering his argument with 
the potential o f serious regret if  action is not taken. “Something must be done to end 
poverty,” he contended in his address to the Amalgamated Clothing Workers in New 
York City before the 50**’ Anniversary Convention. “Something must be done now or 
one day a future generation of Americans will rise up to curse us for the bitter legacy of 
despair that we passed on to them” (1964j 2). Johnson highlighted initiatives that would 
appeal to all American parents, regardless o f social class, emphasizing the importance of 
health and education. He made it clear that having wealth should not be a prerequisite to 
a sound education or basic care.
The president linked the future unhappiness o f America’s children to those 
unsympathetic to or apathetic about, the War on Poverty. “Five and six year old 
children,” he said, “are inheritors of poverty’s curse and not its creators. Unless we act
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these ehildren will pass it onto the next generation, like a family birthmark” (1965a 1). 
This rhetorieal tactie added another enemy to the war—those who oppose helping the 
innocent children eaught in the cyele through no fault of their own. This strategy was 
reinforced by the ereation o f an alternate reality— a reality in which children would be 
successful, free from poverty, and empowered to make a differenee. “We hope, and we 
envision, and we plan, and we pray for the day when every child bom in the world can 
have all the edueation that he or she can take,” the president declared in his acceptanee 
speech to the Internal Platform Association upon receiving the Association’s Annual 
Award. He continued, “that they will be protected in their body and their mind from 
disease; that they will have a chanee to rise out o f the poverty that enslaves them and 
subjugates them; that under leadership of man they can throw off the yokes of the ancient 
enemies of mankind” (1965c 3). In this reality, ehildren would not be subjeet to the trap 
o f poverty, but instead eould suceeed and flourish in a country that supports them. By 
framing his initiatives as ways to help the children of poverty, Johnson attempted to 
equate opposition to his welfare programs with a lack of concern for helpless children.
Johnson strengthened his argument by continually referring to poverty as an 
enemy in his administration’s war, as antagonistic to children. Poverty became an 
opponent as real as the other adversaries during the Cold War. Johnson sought to evoke 
sympathy with this image, to show poverty as a real and viable threat to Ameriean youth. 
He stated, “We have taken up the age-old challenge of poverty and we don’t intend to 
lose generations of our children to this enemy of the human race” (1965b I). Johnson 
used his administration’s policies to combat the destructive force o f poverty, promising 
that, “We have mounted an attaek upon the final fortresses o f poverty. Your children will
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live to see the day when poverty has been transformed from a real menace to a remote 
memory” (1964k 2). This strategy gained power in a society where enemies were elusive 
and victories were difficult to measure. Moreover, this strategy assigned enemy status to 
those who were ambivalent to the cause. As Zarefsky notes, the use o f the war metaphor 
“made it easier for the American people to enlist.” However, he continues, “it also made 
it harder for anyone to oppose the campaign” {President Johnson’s War 33). In this 
model, not supporting the president’s welfare programs became synonymous with aiding 
and abetting the enemy. This enemy, however, was a direct threat to the nation’s 
children. Zarefsky concludes that the “enemy was an impersonal force, but it was aided 
by certain ‘neutrals’ who did not enlist in the struggle” {President Johnson’s War 33). 
This strategically allowed the program to be recast as aid for America’s youth when 
audiences were cynical about the effectiveness o f providing help to impoverished adults.
American Values in the Rhetoric 
o f the War on Poverty 
In attempting to create and reinforce this new reality of poverty and welfare 
reform, Johnson alluded to a series o f moral values for Americans, to the learned values 
inherent in American culture. Renowned social psychologist Milton Rokeach defines a 
value as a “standard or yardstick to guide actions, attitudes, comparisons, evaluations, 
and justifications of self and others” (160). “To say that a person ‘has a value,”’ 
Rokeach writes, is “to say that he (sic) has an enduring belief that a specific mode of 
conduct or end-state of existence is personally and socially preferable to alternative 
modes of conduct or end-states o f existence” (160). Johnson appealed to several national
43
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
values documented by scholars across many disciplines. For example, in describing 
American values, Steele and Redding hold that “Americans like to see the world in moral 
terms. Acts are said to he good or had, ethical or unethical” (85). The president leaned 
on the American ideals o f good vs. evil, imploring his audience that America must fight 
poverty because it is the right thing to do, because the “good guy” would fight poverty. 
“Because it is right,” the president noted, “because it is wise, and because, for the first 
time in our history, it is possible to conquer poverty I submit, for the consideration o f the 
Congress and the country, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964” (1964d 2).
Specifically, Johnson appealed to what Rokeach defines as “instrumental values,” beliefs 
that are always taken for truth (160). Johnson appealed to instrumental values by 
promoting the “American ideal” o f life. If for no other reason, Johnson argued, the War 
on Poverty must we waged because it was right and decent, and therefore the American 
thing to do.
Johnson argued that the War on Poverty would allow all members of society, not 
just the upper classes, to take part in these core American principles including life, liberty ■ 
and the pursuit of happiness, tfe declared:
If we have our way, and if we are successful, and if the American people will 
heed our call, the day will come in this century when we will have won our 
wars— wars against poverty and illiteracy, ignorance and disease. Then think 
about what a great and happy land it will be when all Americans are free and 
when all have equal rights and all have equal privileges, and there is no 
discrimination because o f bank accounts or churches or voter restrictions or color 
or sex. That is the kind of an America we look forward to (1965c 4).
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Johnson spoke to his audience’s values by defining an ideal America that could come to 
pass only with the defeat of poverty. Poverty is presented as just another hurdle, 
hindering the fulfillment of America as the great society. According to the research by 
Steele and Redding, this tactic was well chosen for it had the potential to be effective.
The authors describe a pervasive American attitude that originated in the colonial period. 
They write, “Action, guided by reason and an unshakeable optimism as to results, became 
a moral guiding principle. No problem was too complicated, no obstacle too big for 
determined, optimistic effort” (87). By appealing to his audience’s gratification in 
optimism and results, Johnson attempted to strengthen support for the cause.
The president’s argument was also strengthened by the choice of its defining 
metaphor, as a war dictates opposing sides. This was especially important in depicting the 
enemy. Zarefsky explains: “Having chosen to focus the issue on the poverty problem 
rather than a proposed solution the administration doggedly maintained its position, 
reinterpreting opposing arguments as denials of the need for action” {President Johnson’s 
War 35). Johnson cast the opposition as “evil,” for they apparently denied that anything 
should be done. Zarefsky continues, “Once the attacks had be redefined in terms of the 
administration’s chosen focus, it was easy to derogate them as partisan, trivial, and 
pernicious” {President Johnson’s War 35). Rokeach notes that once a value is accepted 
and internalized by the individual, it becomes the standard by which everything else is 
measured. Opposing arguments would now be measured against these values, making it 
difficult to create an argument that would not be perceived as countering these American 
values.
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As previously discussed, Johnson made an appeal to shared values by using the 
war metaphor not only to create a bond between himself and his audience, but also to 
establish a connection between the audience and those stuck in the “prison of poverty” 
(1964i 2). The president attempted to strengthen the metaphor by linking it to American 
values. Johnson restructured the idea of poverty as an enemy just as deadly, and worthy 
of diligent attack, as the enemies fought in recent wars. As Steele and Redding posit, 
“Loyalty to the tradition and values of America, rather than undifferentiated, egocentric 
nationalism has been . . .  a persistent pattern. Faith in American ideals means a 
willingness to be a good citizen, to be proud of the United States, to defend it from 
external aggression” (90). History demonstrates that United States citizens have been 
willing to fight for their independence, their rights and their pride. Johnson connected 
past military victories to this newest attack on poverty. “Now,” he intoned, “America 
wins the wars that she undertakes. Make no mistake about it. And we have declared war 
on ignorance and illiteracy, we have declared war on poverty, we have declared war on 
disease, and we have declared war on tyranny and aggression. We not only stand for 
these things but we are willing to stand up and die for these things” (1965c 3). Johnson 
appealed to these values to strengthen his argument that poverty was an adversary that 
must be defeated by the War on Poverty. The president utilized the popular ideals of what 
Tom Engelhardt terms a victory culture.
In his book. The End o f  Victory Culture, Engelhardt describes the American 
fixation of victory, where in a battle of good vs. evil, good always triumphs. At the 
beginning of the Cold War, Americans expected wars to be won in the name of freedom 
and justice. Enemies were not uncommon, and their defeat was inevitable. Engelhardt
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asks, “Is there an imaginable America without enemies and without the story o f their 
slaughter and our triumph?” (15). Beginning in elementary school, American children 
regularly encounter stories o f American generosity, victory, and benevolence. As a 
consequence, Englehardt contends, “every child learned in school [that] our history was 
an inclusive saga of expanding liberties and rights that started in a vast, fertile, nearly 
empty land whose native inhabitants more or less faded away after that first 
Thanksgiving” (4). As the Cold War progressed, these images and narratives began to 
change. The enemy was no longer easily diseemed, the “evil” hidden among the ranks of 
the “good.” Engelhardt describes this new enemy as being “everywhere and nowhere, 
inside and out, the postwar enemy seemed omnipresent yet impossible to target” (7). 
Despite the diffieulties posed, a “nightmarish search for enemy-ness became the defining, 
even obsessive domestic act of the Cold War years” (7).
President Johnson utilized this periodic uncertainty to foeus attention on the 
domestic enemy of poverty. He adapted his rhetoric to include a specific and threatening 
foe. Murray Edelman explains the significance o f identifying an enemy: “Politieal facts 
are especially vivid and memorable when the terms that denote them depict a personified 
threat: an enemy, deviant, criminal or wastrel. Faets are easily ignored when they deal 
with statistical probabilities involving people whose characteristics are not known” (14). 
Johnson delineates a spécifié antagonist to give his audience something to fight against. 
The definitive nature o f this foe aided in the redefinition of poverty in Johnson’s rhetorie. 
By targeting his audience’s need to feel victorious, Johnson aimed for total victory in an 
uncertain era.
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The use of the military metaphor was strategic, Zarefsky argues, because it 
“suggested choices about how to deseribe the objective, the enemy and the weapons and 
tactics.” Though helpful, he continues, “each also contained the seeds of its own 
destruction” {President Johnson’s War 20). Ironically, while these rhetorical strategies 
added initial strength to Johnson’s argument, the grandeur o f the selected metaphors 
ultimately contributed to the demise of the War on Poverty. The growing conflict in 
Vietnam also interfered with the success of the military metaphors. The ambiguous 
figurative enemy of poverty would become secondary to the literal enemies in Vietnam. 
As Communication professor Kathleen Turner notes, “Domestie concerns about which 
Johnson cared so passionately took a baek seat to the defense o f the war with which he 
did not want to deal” (186). Schulman adds that Johnson was forced to withdraw funding 
from his Great Society programs in order to cover the costs o f the Vietnam War. The 
president “believed he could protect the Great Society by downplaying the expense o f his 
two-front war; he covered up the costs of the Asian struggle, economized on every 
domestie program, and delayed a tax increase as long as possible.” However, Schulman 
concludes, “This strategy failed. Eventually, he had to scale baek the Great Society to 
fight the war that took up more and more o f his time and energy” (101). The use of a war 
metaphor, though initially stratégie, could not overcome the importance of an aetual 
military conflict in Vietnam.
Conelusion
Patterson aptly describes the trajectory o f the War on Poverty when he writes that, 
as “it turned out, the war on poverty eventually sputtered into a skirmish” (97). Though
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there is substantial debate from historical scholars as to the effectiveness of the Johnson 
administration, there is little disagreement that, on the whole, the War on Poverty at best 
failed to meet expectations, and at worst failed completely.
The chief critieism of Johnson’s War on Poverty is the gross overreaeh o f rhetorie 
without the means to support it. Johnson promised, “And I pledge to you for the years to 
come we are going to build together the kind of nation that [FDR] hoped for, that Harry 
S. Tmman worked for, and that our beloved John F. Kennedy died for. We are going to 
build a Great Society where no man or woman is the victim of fear or poverty or hatred; 
where every man and woman has the chance for fulfillment and prosperity and hope” 
(1964L 1). Johnson embraced a challenge that his legendary predecessors were unable 
to meet. “Paralleling the New Deal,” political scientist Douglas R. Imig explains, “the 
War on Poverty was envisioned as an effective and targeted intervention that would 
surgically cut to the heart of the causes behind hunger and poverty in the United States” 
(31), Though similarly laced with good intentions, the New Deal and the War on Poverty 
are separated by the feasibility o f the rhetoric used to articulate, and to advocate for, the 
policy. O f Johnson’s goal, Patterson adds “perhaps no government program in modem 
American history promised so much more than it delivered” (147). When analyzing 
contemporary criticism of the War on Poverty, Waddan notes that part “of the problem 
lies in the nature o f the political rhetoric and the messages conveyed about what was 
intended and what eould be achieved. ‘Great Society’ and ‘War on Poverty’ are much 
grander expressions which promise mueh more than ‘The New Deal’’’ (68). The name of 
the program alone raised the limit of expectations to astronomical heights. The promise
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of an all out attack on poverty that sought annihilation of the centuries-old problem was 
simply more than any single administration could ever deliver.
The attitude of the administration also eontributed to what Zarefsky describes as a 
“stalemate” in the War on Poverty. Pulitzer Prize winning author and presidential 
historian Doris Kearns (Goodwin) deseribes Johnson’s attitude towards the practieality of 
his initiatives as naive. She states, “There could be, he believed, no fundamental or 
impenetrable barriers to changes that would be beneficial to all, and that everyone 
desired— or would desire—once they understood the purpose and the inevitable 
consequences of those changes” (220). Zarefsky highlights a key difficulty in launching 
such a rhetorically large war, when he asks, “[H]ow would one know whether or not the 
war had been vietorious? And without sueh knowledge, was the War on Poverty destined 
to be a war without end?” {President Johnson’s War 56). Johnson vaguely addressed this 
critical issue in his address to the Speaker o f the House on “Stepping Up the War on 
Poverty,” when he deelared, “We reaffirm our faith that poverty ean be eliminated from 
this country, and our solemn commitment to prosecute the war against poverty to a 
successful eonclusion. For the struggle is not only for the liberation of those imprisoned 
in poverty, but for the conscience and the values o f a prosperous and free nation” (1965a 
1). The conelusion is problematic. Although the War on Poverty made strides in helping 
the poor, it was not a complete success; henee, given Johnson’s elaborate rhetoric, it was 
a failure. Johnson did not advocate small victories, but large triumphs.
Keams posits that these “gigantic aspirations— although clearly unattainable 
within one Presideney, or one generation—were n o t . . . intended merely as rhetorical 
exhortation. They expressed Johnson’s intention to embark on a mammoth program of
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social reform” (211). But even the best of intentions needed substance to ensure their 
evolution into policy. As Edward D. Berkowitz, professor of history, public policy and 
public administration at George Washington University, explains, “The War on Poverty 
relied on untested theory for its design and unrestrained enthusiasm for its 
implementation” (114). Though Johnson advocated the destruetion of the eycle of 
poverty, providing a definitive solution proved impossible. Unfortunately, Zarefsky 
eoncludes, “No evidenee was introduced, nor eould any have been that the administration 
fully understood or knew how to deal with the cycle-of poverty theory which it 
espoused” {President Johnson’s War 37). This only added to the lack of clarity when 
trying to determine victory.
An ill-conceived rhetorical strategy alone did not ensure the failure of the War on 
Poverty. Richard K. Caputo, professor social policy and research, documents an equally 
signifieant problem, a laek o f funds. He notes that the OEO did not receive suffieient 
support to complete the tasks it was designed to do. “If all OEO money went directly to 
the poor as income, which most did not, each poor person in America would have 
received around $50 to $75 per year” (334). Also, the eommunity action programs that 
were designed to aid in the war on poverty initiatives were simply spread too thin. 
Aeeording to Caputo, “O f the 600 poorest counties in the country (one-fifth of all 
counties), 215 were not eovered at all by a CAP” (334). The deficiency of necessary 
funds limited what could actually be accomplished. Small wonder that in analyzing the 
failures of the War on Poverty, Jeffrey Tulis surmised in The Rhetorical Presidency that 
the “primary problem was to fashion a program that fit Johnson’s rhetoric while it 
adhered to his budget eeiling” (166).
51
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Scholars also argue that the War on Poverty had unexpected consequences that 
resulted from its lack o f success. Waddan notes that “eritics on the right eondemn it as 
an over-ambitious project which was not only doomed to failure but which was also 
bound to compound the very problems it set out to resolve” (53). The War on Poverty 
influeneed popular opinion. Patterson explains; “By the time the war on poverty lost its 
political glamor [sic], its limitations had intensified the country’s doubts about the ability 
of experts to diagnose, much less cure, the ills of the poor” (122). That skepticism is still 
seen in politieal debate in 2007.
Although Johnson’s rhetoric far outstretched his means to implement policy, 
some scholars argue that the War on Poverty was not eompletely without vietory. 
Economies scholar Nicolas Spulber, for example, eontends that:
President Johnson’s ‘war on poverty’ initiated some new programs and 
consolidated and expanded the coverage o f some programs already on the books. 
These concerned: (i) human investment programs destined to inerease earnings 
capacities (namely, compensatory education and skill training; extension of 
coverage of minimum wage laws); (ii) earning replacement programs designed to 
alleviate precipitous declines in income (unemployment insurance; disability 
compensation; Social Security); and (iii) provision of goods in kind and services 
ineluding heath eare (direct in-kind programs for food; low-income housing; 
hospital insurance and medical care) (87).
In addition, Waddan argues that in order to analyze fully the effects of the War on 
Poverty, the long term impact must be considered. He notes that several of the programs 
started or strengthened by the administration’s efforts had long-lasting effeets. For
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example, Johnson’s policies helped to provide better health-care for several segments of 
the Ameriean population ineluding the elderly and the poor (70). The program also 
contributed to the decreased poverty rate: 22.2 percent in 1960, to 11.7 percent in 1979. 
(71). Historian Robert Dallek also highlights some of the achievements o f the War on 
Poverty: “For one, federal spending on the poor had increased in every relevant 
category— education and training, health, and cash benefits like social security and 
unemployment insurance . . .  had raised government outlays for the poor from nearly $13 
billion in 1963 to almost $20 billion in 1966” {Flawed Giant 330). Though not entirely 
suecessful, the War on Poverty did have lasting politieal effects, in that it raised 
awareness for poverty, and contributed to the more intense presence o f poverty as a 
matter of significant political debate (Caputo 335).
Although Lyndon Johnson’s rhetorical strategies differed markedly from Ronald 
Reagan’s, as becomes clear in the next ehapter, the end result o f their advocaey on behalf 
of the disadvantaged was strikingly similar. In the last week o f his presidency, Johnson 
gave a speech summarizing his presidency. He concluded, “Now, it is time to leave. I 
hope it may be said, a hundred years from now, that by working together we helped to 
make our country more just, more just for all of its people, as well as to insure and 
guarantee the blessings o f liberty for all of our posterity. That is what I hope. But I 
believe that at least it will be said that we tried” (1969 6). Almost forty years later, it is 
debatable whether that hope has been fulfilled. But the historical and rhetorical accounts 
of the War on Poverty would indicate that the latter part of his statement has been 
realized. There is elear evidence that, although the Johnson administration failed in its
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attempts to eradiate poverty, the president’s failure was not for want of an idealistic, if  
not unrealistic, rhetoric.
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CHAPTER THREE
REAGAN REDEFINES POVERTY AND WELFARE 
When Ronald Reagan entered office in 1981, Ameriea was eaught in a tumultuous 
eeonomic storm. Words like “unemployment,” “inflation,” and “deficit” cast dark 
shadows on the American dream. (Dunn, Imig, Maney) Another word that caused 
conservatives to cringe and prepared liberals to fight was welfare. After decades of 
massive effort and what was pereeived as little success, Americans had grown weary of 
the govemmenf s efforts to aid the impoverished. The welfare debate was as heated as it 
was ambiguous. Part of the ehallenge lay in the faet that politieal leaders had to 
determine not only how to deal with poverty, but who qualified as “truly poor.”
In order to properly address the problems of an expensive welfare program and a 
growing poverty population, Reagan encountered the rhetorical problem of defining 
controversial terms. Argumentation scholar Douglas Walton contends that people take it 
for granted that “terms used in legal statutes and government regulations, have an 
objective meaning” (122). The success of Reagan’s reform strategies depended on how 
both politicians and average Americans understood the reality of welfare and poverty. 
Reagan defined the terms of the welfare debate by attacking the War on Poverty, 
redefining welfare as a suffocating trap, rhetorically constructing the poverty population 
into two distinct entities, and dissociating both the government and the American people 
from the failures of the welfare system. David Zarefsky, Carol Miller-Tutzauer and
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Frank E. Tutzauer summarize Reagan’s strategy o f redefinition: “His behavior . . .  bears 
out the more general aphorism that the person who can set the terms of the debate has the 
power to win it” (119). Reagan utilized the presidency to set the terms of the debate to 
redefine the War on Poverty, poverty, and welfare.
The effects of Reagan administration policy continue to unfold, though to some 
observers they are increasingly clear. Joseph Davey, professor o f law, contends in The 
New Social Contract: Am erica’s Journey from  Welfare State to Police State, that during 
“the Reagan years there was a net increase in the number of people living at or below the 
poverty level” (49). James T. Patterson notes that Reagan’s Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1981 actually increased poverty by two percent. (206) This act 
limited assistance given to people helped by the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
program (AFDC). Welfare scholar David Stoesz adds that because of the act, “Suddenly, 
AFDC family heads who were trying to improve their economic lot found that (1) they 
could deduct only $160 per month per child for childcare, (2) the deduction for work 
expenses was limited to $75 per month, and (3) the earned income disregard . . . was 
eliminated after four months.” This resulted in penalties to “welfare families with an 
adult participating in the labor market” (21).
It is clear from the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act that the rhetoric and 
actions of the Reagan administration are in direct contrast with each other. Instead of 
achieving the desired aim of getting people off the welfare rolls, these policies both 
increased the percentage of the population living below the poverty level and made the 
situations of the impoverished worse than they had been already. For example, David T. 
Ellwood notes that between 1976 and 1984, “welfare expenditures per poor person had
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fallen dramatically— almost 30 percent per poor person on average” (41). Further, 
Patricia Dunn, author o f “The Reagan Solution for Aiding Families With Dependent 
Children: Reflections o f an Earlier Era,” reports, “The reductions have cut into basic 
food, shelter and clothing needs o f desperately poor children. The administration’s 
proposals not only cut the disposable incomes of these families, but also reduced the 
rewards o f work by imposing high marginal tax rates, the amount by which disposable 
income is reduced for each additional dollar earned” (105). The effects were evident in 
many aspects of life from housing to medical care, from ehild care to taxes. Though the 
effects were widespread, poor people themselves were the most affected population. In 
Ronald Reagan: The Politics o f  Symbolism, historian Robert Dallek notes that Reagan 
“slowed the growth of spending on social programs for the least affluent and politically 
weakest members of society” (73). Programs designed to help poor Americans with little 
access to political power and with little voice were curtailed most sharply.
The Reagan administration also proposed substantial cuts to the Food Stamp 
program, cuts that yielded drastic results. According to Chester Hartman, author and 
Director of Research of the Poverty and Race Research Active Council, the proposed 
reform o f food stamps would be considered income, and the recipients therefore would be 
taxed on it. Hartman notes, “Since poorer households get more food stamps, the move, 
o f course, would have stuck the lowest-income households with the biggest rent 
increases, in absolute terms and relative to their rent-paying capacities” (258). Although 
such reform would “save” the government money, it failed to improve the plight of the 
poor. While in his rhetoric Reagan advocated for the “truly needy,” his actions proved 
detrimental to their economic situation. Douglas R. Imig, author of Poverty and Power:
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The Political Representation o f  Poor Americans, notes that during “the Reagan years, 
recession, tax cuts, changing welfare laws, and business shifts drove inereasing numbers 
of people into poverty, deprived them of health care, and increased their tax burden”
(Imig 23). These policies increased the poverty population and made their plight more 
difficult.
Hartman described the attitudes o f the administration: “The philosophical and 
practical retreat from an aggressive government role in alleviating the housing problem of 
those the market eannot serve has been dramatic, as evidenced by the programs the 
administration has abandoned and attempted to abandon” (265). The administration also 
attacked public housing. As a result, “the National Low Income Housing Coalition has 
estimated the total cuts in federal housing assistance between 1981 and 1985 at 60 
percent” (Davey 45). Marjorie Hope and James Young noted, “For each dollar 
authorized for national defense in 1980, nineteen cents was authorized for subsidized 
housing programs. In 1984, only three cents was authorized for subsidized housing for 
each military dollar” (141). Although Reagan administration policy had devastating 
effects on America’s poor, those effects were hidden under the guise o f protection. By 
providing new definitions o f poverty and welfare, and by articulating the “failures” o f the 
War on Poverty, President Reagan constructed a social reality that justified sharp cuts in 
government assistance to the poor.
Reagan Attacks the War on Poverty
President Reagan redefined poverty and welfare reform by juxtaposing his 
administration with that o f past presidents, particularly Lyndon Johnson. He focused on
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the shortcomings of Johnson’s’ initiatives, criticizing the War on Poverty in order to 
show a clear need for change. In his autobiography. An American Life, Reagan compares 
the War on Poverty to a baseball game. He writes, “The liberals had had their turn at bat 
in the 1960s and they had struck out” (199). In doing this, Reagan defined the reality of 
government involvement during the 1960s. For example, during a White House briefing 
he subtly referred to the War on Poverty stating, “Twenty years ago, with the best of 
intentions, the Federal Government began a program that it hoped would wipe out 
poverty in America” (1987b 2). Instead o f improving the economic situation of the poor, 
Reagan argued, “poverty actually went up as the Federal Government spent more to 
eliminate it” (1987b 3). Shaping his audience’s views on the War on Poverty, or at least 
attempting to do so, became crucial to Reagan’s strategy as he presented his own 
solutions to the poverty problem. In the same speech he stated, “We have to fight the 
impulse of many to believe that one policy change or reform, written and implemented 
here in Washington, can solve the problem of poverty and welfare dependency. We 
know from 20 years [of] painful experience that it cannot” (1987b 3). Here the War on 
Poverty is not an overzealous attempt at reform but instead a government mistake that 
Reagan depicts as both lasting and trying.
Even in his autobiography, Reagan’s stance on social welfare is clear. He writes: 
“The waste in dollars and cents was small compared with the waste of human potential.
It was squandered by the narcotic o f giveaway programs that sapped the human spirit, 
diminished the incentive of people to work, destroyed families, and produced an increase 
in female and child poverty, deteriorating schools, and disintegrating neighborhoods”
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(199). This characterization of the centerpiece of Johnson’s Great Society as counter 
productive at best, and harmful at worst, is a running theme throughout his rhetorie.
There are also recurring instances in whieh Reagan directly used deprecating 
humor when diseussing the War on Poverty. What he lacked in variety, he made up for 
in frequency. During White House briefing in May o f 1987, Reagan joked, “The Federal 
Government does not know how to get people off o f welfare and into productive lives.
We had a war on poverty—poverty won” (1987d 1). This remark was followed by 
laughter from the audience, members of the American Legislative Exchange Council.
Two years later, at a Dinner for the Knights of Malta in New York, Reagan announced, 
“Twenty years ago the Government declared war on poverty. Poverty won” (1989 1). In 
an interview with the Wall Street Journal in February o f 1985, Reagan also used this 
“joke”— “[W]e put into effect the War on Poverty, which started in the last half of the 
sixties and ran through the seventies— and poverty won” (1985a 9). In a radio address a 
year later, he discussed the War on Poverty as if  it were a humorous situation. “In 1964,” 
he observed, “the famous War on Poverty was declared and a funny thing happened.. . .  I 
guess you could say, poverty won the war” (1986 1). And again in October 1985, “You 
know . . . we’ve gone through some recent periods here— 1965 until 1980, the last year 
before our administration, the Great Society and the War on Poverty, which poverty won, 
went into effect” (1985b 2). This statement again elicited laughter from the audience, the 
Reagan-Bush Campaign Leadership groups. He also got a laugh out of the attendees at a 
fundraising luncheon for Gubernatorial candidate Jim Bunning in Kentucky: “1 remember 
one such program that was proposed during the war on poverty—which poverty won”
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(1983 1). Reagan trivializes the War on Poverty as a detrimental mistake of a misguided 
federal government.
James T. Patterson, in his book, Am erica’s Struggle against Poverty in the 
Twentieth Century, summarizes the differenees between Johnson and Reagan’s political 
agenda concerning poverty. He states, “The goal o f social policy in the Johnson (and 
even the Nixon) years had started with the question, ‘How can we help the poor?’
Reagan, in contrast, tended to ask, ‘How can we cut costs, and how can we get people to 
work?’” (206). His challenge was to frame cuts in assistance to the poor as opportunities 
for those in need to help themselves.
The strategy in redefining the War on Poverty was not merely to compare Reagan 
and Johnson with Reagan being portrayed more favorably. Aeeording to Reagan’s 
definitions, the real reason the War on Poverty failed was not because Johnson’s rhetoric 
established unrealistic expectations, but rather that it was based solely on government 
intervention. For Reagan, this was an attack on big government as much as it was a 
denigration o f President Johnson. The reconstruction of the War on Poverty is erucial in 
understanding Reagan’s rhetorical strategy. If Reagan had only attacked Johnson, then 
fault would be placed on the man, not the office of the presidency. Therefore, replacing 
Johnson would be sufficient to solve the problem. But Reagan did not leave his criticism 
there. Instead, he illuminated the problems of a federal government entrenched in 
welfare programs. This allowed him to shift his criticism seamlessly from Johnson to 
centralized government to the War on Poverty.
Reagan consistently attempted to redefine the War on Poverty as a colossal 
government failure. Central to this goal were efforts to depict poverty as the result of
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government policy. Once he has defined the system— including the War on Poverty and 
strong government intervention—as a cause o f the problem, he freed himself and his 
surrogates to present an alternative solution. The eomerstone o f Reagan’s solution is 
reliance on a decentralized federal government. Reagan observed in a radio address to 
the nation: “We know the solutions to welfare dependency must come from States and 
communities, and those o f us here in Washington must have the courage to let them try” 
(1987a 2). He emphasized the need for local and state governments to take over the 
poverty problem. Again making a slight dig at the War on Poverty and Johnson’s 
overreached rhetoric, he asked, “In looking for a solution to the poverty problem, isn’t it 
time Washington got a dose of humility and turned to you for help?” (1987d 2). This 
strategy was especially important as it subtly took responsibility away not only from the 
federal government, but from Reagan himself. This was the first step in Reagan’s 
attempt to distance himself from the poverty problem. This strategy made it possible for 
Reagan to redirect all responsibility onto other government organizations. If the 
responsibility rested with others, then he could not be blamed for any failures or 
consequences of new policies.
Welfare as a Trap: Reagan’s Redefinition 
o f Government Aid
Central to Reagan’s strategy is the redefinition of welfare, which heavily focused 
on failures o f the past. In a radio address on February 7, 1987, for instance, Reagan 
contended that the sad truth is that our welfare system represents one long and sorry tale 
of disappointment. From the 1950’s on, poverty in America was on the decline as
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economic growth led millions up toward prosperity. Then, as the Federal Government 
began to spend billions on welfare programs, poverty stopped shrinking and actually 
began to grow worse. For the first time in our nation’s history, millions of Americans 
became virtual wards o f the State, trapped in a cycle o f welfare dependency that robs 
them of dignity and opportunity. . . . No one doubts that welfare programs were designed 
with the best o f intentions, but neither can anyone doubt that they’ve failed— failed to 
boost people out of dependency” (1987a 1).
Reagan consistently defines the welfare system of Johnson and Nixon as a trap. “It’s now 
common knowledge that our welfare system has itself become a poverty trap— a creator 
and reinforcer o f dependency” (1987e 1). In a panel diseussion on welfare reform, he 
depicted a “welfare system that’s very good at keeping people poor” (1987c 1). In his 
description o f the War on Poverty Reagan stated, “Instead of providing a ladder out of 
poverty, welfare became a net of dependency that held millions back” (1988 2). Where 
Johnson would have argued that poverty is the trap, Reagan instead placed emphasis on 
the debilitating effects o f the welfare system in place. In a speech at a Republican 
Fundraising Dinner in 1981, Reagan supported his trap definition with an excerpt from an 
emotional letter written by an “elderly lady in New Orleans.” Focusing on race, he 
observed that “she was black, but she said, ‘Thank you for doing away with the war on 
poverty.’ She said, ‘Thank you for letting us once again try our own muscle and not 
become helpless dependents’” (1981c 1). These descriptions of the poor reinforce the 
definition of welfare as a dirty word, as something undesirable, filled with irresponsible 
citizens who need to wean themselves off o f government support.
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Reagan was not subtle in his attempts to reinforce the connotative definition of 
welfare. In a radio address in February 1986, he linked welfare families with unwed 
teenage mothers, deadbeat fathers, families deeply entrenched in laziness, and a lack of 
responsibility. He juxtaposed this hopeless picture with images o f “normal” families, 
those who work hard and work together to “escape poverty and grab hold of the rungs on 
the ladder o f opportunity” (1986 1). It is here, in the definition o f welfare that Reagan 
begins to place distance between impoverished Americans and “normal,” hard working 
Americans. Reagan continued to attach a stigma to welfare recipients, and thereby 
discouraged those who would benefit from government support. In Poverty and Power: 
The Political Representation o f  Poor Americans, Douglas R. Imig writes, “Accepting 
assistance beeame more stigmatized as the White House led the rhetorical charge against 
welfare abuse” (17). Reagan equated welfare receipt with welfare abuse, and in doing so 
“managed to paint a picture o f the Great Society as one o f free handouts, particularly to 
the poor who seem unwilling to make a contribution in return” (Gotsch-Thomson 236). 
Reagan’s rhetoric equated poverty programs with handouts to a largely undeserving 
population, thereby enforcing the stereotypes o f a fraudulent poor.
Dunn wrote during Reagan’s first term that the president and his advisors viewed
poverty
as a personal failure. Welfare mothers must be put to work at any sort of menial 
or make-work task because working is good for the character. Our economy 
works because people work, and lack o f work leads to dependency on welfare. 
This philosophy is an echo o f Social Darwinism which held that there is no place 
for such realities as unemployment, lack o f training and skill, no transportation,
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lack of child care, bias, diserimination, and lack of job opportunities that pay 
living wages (104).
Here, Reagan asserts that welfare promotes laziness and rewards inaction. Welfare 
supports the inept mothers, neglectful fathers and general apathy.
For Reagan, “poverty was un-American, welfare wasteful and counterproductive” 
(Patterson 207). Reagan’s welfare rhetoric supported this assumption and encouraged the 
fortification of this constructed reality. It was important for Reagan to solidify this 
reality, as it was necessary for his audience to agree that there was a problem. By 
forwarding these new definitions of welfare and poverty, Reagan controlled the way 
essential terms of policy-making were discussed. Here, Reagan’s reality started to focus 
on shifting responsibility from the government to individual people. He constructed a 
reality that poverty was a “personal failure,” the fateful combination of a slothful 
individual and an over-indulgent federal government.
This strategy also became benefieial in garnering publie support. By returning 
consistently to the positive themes o f “family” and work ethic, Reagan constructed an 
argument difficult to contradict. This rhetorical reality linked positive traits to welfare 
reform, and negative consequences to past and eurrent systems. Historian David Farber 
notes that Reagan “asserted that unless people were willing to live by what they ealled 
‘traditional family values’ and to accept that economic difficulties were the problem of 
the individual, not society, they were not truly Amerieans, and so deserved to be 
excluded from the body politic and punished by respectable society” (267). The fact that 
this perspective blatantly ignored desperate segments o f the population would prove to 
have devastating effects.
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Though President Reagan was careful to make only veiled references when 
reinforcing the definition o f welfare as a dirty word, he offered conciliatory statements in 
an attempt to appear as though he rejected the typical stereotypes. Like Johnson, Reagan 
acknowledged prevailing attitudes concerning the poor. He candidly stated, “From 
dealing as a Governor closer at hand with welfare, and those people, I think truly that the 
bulk o f the people on welfare aren’t just lazy bums or cheaters—they want nothing more 
than to be independent, free of the social workers, and out on their own once again” 
(emphasis added 1987b 4). Though this statement contrasted directly with much of his 
other rhetoric, it allowed him to continue to promote his workfare ideals by associating it 
with positive characteristics.
The Solution: Protecting the Truly Needy 
In February o f 1981, Reagan revealed his plans for reinvigorating the economy. 
One of his first goals was to decrease government spending. After describing the steps 
that needed to be taken, and the budget cuts that would result from this economic 
overhaul, Reagan reassured the country that “Our spending cuts will not be at the expense 
o f the truly needy. We will, however, seek to eliminate benefits to those who are not 
really qualified by reason of need” (1981 a 4). David Zarefsky, Carol Miller-Tutzauer, 
and Frank E. Tutzauer argue in their article, “Reagan’s Safety Net for the Truly Needy: 
The Rhetorical Uses of Definition,” that the “adjective ‘truly’ is a good signal that the 
noun it modifies has been dissociated” (114). The authors draw upon the research of 
Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca to discern and apply the rhetorical strategy of 
dissociation.
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Dissociation functions, they explain, as a means to separate a “unitary concept” 
into two distinct parts, “pairing it with two philosophically opposed terms, one of which 
is a value to be preferred over the other” (114). The rhetor then creates a link between 
the more favorable term and the view that is being forwarded in the argument. The same 
is done with the unfavorable term and the idea in contrast to that of the rhetor’s.
Zarefsky, Miller-Tutzauer, and Tutzauer explain that by emphasizing “truly” in the 
phrase “truly needy,” Reagan created clear dissociation between two types o f need in 
America. The first kind of need the authors describe as “apparent” or “fraudulent” need. 
This need is in direct contrast to the “truly needy,” the segment o f the poverty population 
that Reagan describes as deserving of federal aid. By dissociating the word “needy” 
Reagan rhetorically constructs two very different populations: the “truly needy” who are 
thereby entitled to government benefits, and the “apparent needy” who he argues have 
been irresponsible, wasting government resources and Americans’ tax dollars.
Through dissociation, Reagan rationalized severe budget cuts while 
simultaneously contending that the deserving poor would be accommodated. The 
introduction of the “truly needy” as a social class was strategic in gaining the approval 
both of his supporters and his opponents. As Zarefsky, Miller-Tutzauer, and Tutzauer 
note, “Not only has Reagan not repudiated the government’s historic commitment to help 
those in need, he has reaffirmed it— adding only the innocuous proviso that the need must 
be for real” (114). This classification o f the “truly needy,” despite its apparent clarity, is 
strategically ambiguous.
Although perhaps initially beneficial, this became problematic as Reagan offered 
no standards or system of measurement to determine who exactly the “truly needy” were.
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In fact, after this speech “media attention focused on the fuzziness o f the phrase. In the 
immediate aftermath o f the speech, one widespread reaction was that the President 
needed to be more precise about his plans” (Zarefsky, Miller-Tutzauer, and Tutzauer 
114). Furthermore, Zarefsky, Miller-Tutzauer, and Tutzauer argue that as his term 
progressed, Reagan’s policies made it increasingly more difficult to be classified as “truly 
needy.” In part, Reagan’s reassurance that the “truly needy” would be taken care of 
stemmed from his commitment to a “safety net” o f government programs.
This “safety net” would serve as a means o f protecting the “truly needy” and 
ensuring that all deserving members of society would be able to rely on government 
support. The existence o f a rhetorical “safety net” was meant to assuage the fears of 
those who were concerned that drastic cuts to social programs would deprive the “truly 
needy” of deserved basic assistance.
Reagan’s continued reclassification o f the “truly needy” was not without 
repercussions. Because it became harder to be classified as “truly needy,” fewer people 
qualified to take advantage of government support, thus the number o f recipients eligible 
to be caught by the “safety net” declined sharply. Imig notes that “Tighter eligibility 
requirements meant decreasing rates o f participation in federal programs despite 
increasing poverty rates” (19). Because o f this, “Almost all families with earnings of any 
kind were denied AFDC (Aid to families with Dependent Children) and related support, 
including heath benefits. Moreover, social-service agencies lost their outreach budgets 
and faced stiff penalties for overpayments, undermining their willingness to extend 
benefits” (19). Although Reagan spoke o f allowing the states to exercise “creativity” and 
“freedom” in solving the poverty problem, his administration continued to watch over the
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State governments’ shoulders. Imig writes, “Strict penalties were enacted for states with 
enrollment errors above 4 percent” (20). This seemingly minor action yielded skepticism 
and fear among states. So much so, Imig continues, that “already-harried departments of 
social services became extremely uneasy about extending benefits to new applicants” 
(20). These initiatives, designed to decrease wasteful government spending, had 
detrimental effects on agencies in compliance with government regulations and left many 
families worse off than before.
Sustained criticism accompanied Reagan’s assurances that administration policy 
would protect the “truly needy.” Anthony Champagne and Edward J. Harpham state in 
the introduction to their analysis o f The Attack on the Welfare State, that “conservative 
rhetoric clearly departs from reality when it claims that the proposed cutbacks are aimed 
at only removing the ‘haves’ from various welfare programs while continuing to help the 
‘truly needy’ through a social safety net” (2). Declaring a segment of the population 
“truly needy” eliminates aid to a large portion o f the culture o f poverty.
Reagan’s clear division of the truly needy from the dependent needy is ironic 
considering the context o f the times. David Stoesz notes in ^  Poverty o f  Imagination: 
Bootstrap Capitalism, Sequel to Welfare Reform, for example, that the “1980s were 
particularly punishing for poor families” (21). As economic conditions continued to 
worsen, more and more Americans were entering the community o f poverty. Reagan’s 
initiatives, designed to help the “truly needy,” ignored this descending segment o f the 
population. As Imig notes, “Fewer services were available to increasing numbers of poor 
people. Particularly hard hit were the recent additions to the poverty rolls and those 
approaching the poverty line. These groups were excluded from food stamps, AFDC,
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and the school-lunch program” (16). In other words, much of the “reform” not only 
ignored many of America’s impoverished, it added to the poverty population. “Long­
term poverty,” Imig writes, “increased as low-income people were forced into deeper 
destitution before qualifying for assistance” (17). In addition, the “truly needy” were also 
often excluded from proper medical care under Reagan’s reforms. Champagne and 
Harpham explain: “Not surprisingly those who have suffered the most from the major 
cuts in health care financing have been those who could be considered ‘truly needy’” (4). 
Despite substantial commentary on the flaws in the administration’s depiction of the 
“truly needy,” such appeals continued to define Reagan’s rhetoric throughout his 
presidential tenure.
The effects of Reagan administration “reforms” extended beyond recipients of 
housing support and food stamps to other marginalized members of society. Champagne 
and Harpham, for instance, discussed Reagan’s attack on disability programs. Similar to 
welfare, significant numbers of the deserving poor did not qualify for assistance under the 
administration’s new standards. The administration, the authors note, used “existing laws 
and the administrative process to remove thousands from disability rolls and to make it 
very difficult for thousands o f others to get on them. The political and human costs of 
this attack on the disability program have been high” (4). This is in direct contrast to 
Reagan’s statement in February 1981 when he reassured those concerned that “We will 
continue to fulfill the obligations that spring from your national conscience.. . .  Those 
who, through no fault of their own, must depend on the rest o f us—the poverty stricken, 
the disabled, the elderly, all those with true need— can rest assured that the social safety 
net o f programs they depend on are exempt from any cuts” (1981b 2). Despite such
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declarations, however, Reagan’s initiatives made it difficult even for disabled Americans 
to meet the criteria that defined the “truly needy.” With no explicit or precise definition 
o f this pivotal term in place, those in need o f assistance had little legal recourse when 
attempting to determine their eligibility for support.
The persuasive power o f this strategy can be explained by the social construction 
of reality and the power o f definition. Edward Schiappa notes in his book. Defining 
Reality, that publics “must be persuaded to agree; such persuasion may be simple and 
direct or complicated and time-consuming” (30). At first, Reagan had to lay out his 
definitions of both poverty and welfare, and to do so carefully, systematically and 
repeatedly. Once the American people were introduced to terms including “safety net” 
and “truly needy,” and once those definitions were recognized, Reagan could continue.
He had to construct a reality for his audience that included the unwavering confidence 
that the administration’s policies would not harm the “truly needy.” Once this reality was 
accepted, simple reference to the government’s efforts to alleviate the problems of the 
poor would inspire confidence in government policy. The “truly needy” became a 
standard refrain designed to provide the illusion of a carefully constructed definition of 
the population that would benefit from revisions o f entitlement programs. The absence of 
formal, concrete definitions o f key terms enabled Reagan to succeed with a balancing act; 
he appeared at once to support essential programs for the poor, while simultaneously 
curtailing funds for social support programs. Once they were convinced that Reagan had 
no intention o f harming the “truly needy,” the American public proved receptive to what 
might be termed an early form of “compassionate conservatism.” The strategic 
ambiguity of “the truly needy” thus made the absence of a strict definition acceptable,
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and relieved the president o f any responsibility for articulating, defining, or explaining 
clear-cut terms or policy criteria.
Critical to the acceptance o f the idea o f the “truly needy” is the existence o f the 
non-needy. Acknowledgment that there were genuinely poor and needy people in the 
United States served also to confirm that there were other citizens abusing the system. 
Reagan disassociated the two groups, and placed the American people among those who 
would defend the “truly needy.” Reagan’s rhetorical strategy of identification is 
consistently clear in this regard. Identification occurs when a persuader shows an 
audience that the beliefs or values they share are more important than the ways in which 
they might differ. Kenneth Burke describes identification as follows: “A is not identical 
with his (sic) colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is identified with 
B. Or he may identify himself with B even when their interests are not joined, if  he 
assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so” (20). Burke continues, “In being 
identified with B, A is ‘substantially one’ with a person other than himself. Yet at the 
same time he remains unique, an individual locus o f motives. Thus, he is both joined and 
separate, at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with another” (21). Reagan 
sought to employ identification to unite his diverse audience in support o f the “truly 
needy.” Identification joins people together, uniting them based on at least one 
commonality, even if  apart from that they are very different. Reagan linked his audience 
to the “truly needy,” but also critically against the “abusers” of the welfare system, thus 
creating a clear “us” against the indolent and fraudulent “non-needy.”
Robert Asen, author o f Visions o f  Poverty, describes Reagan’s explicit use of 
identification. “The president allied the American people, the individual worker, the
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business operator, American industry, and himself against the non-needy recipients, 
politicians and bureaucrats” (22). At the center o f this rhetoric is the defense o f the 
government budget, emphasizing that there was a threat to the economic security o f the 
country in the form of lazy, undeserving welfare recipients. Political scientist Ardith L. 
Maney explains that, “Part of the success o f the president and his allies came because 
they had tapped into popular attitudes about fraud, waste, and abuse that seem to be 
permanently attached to means-tested social programs in the United States” (139). As 
suppliers of government funds through tax dollars, middle- and upper-class Americans 
could find comfort in Reagan’s assertions that the waste would not continue. In an era of 
economic insecurity, potential threats to American financial security would be taken 
seriously.
The president constantly reassured taxpayers: “My friends, I believe we’re too 
great a nation, too generous o f heart, too bold in finding solutions, to permit waste of 
lives and money to continue” (1987a 1). Fortunately for Reagan, his assurances to 
taxpayers were substantiated with real numbers. According to Imig, “During the course 
of the Reagan presidency, median family income rose by 7.5 percent while poverty 
remained high” (23). Reagan utilized identification strategies to gain the support of 
Americans who were concerned about their money being spent frivolously. He united his 
audience by attributing to them such flattering characteristics as “great,” “generous,” and 
“bold.” In doing so, he gained support for his goal o f curtailing government entitlement 
programs. Given that Americans were great, generous and bold, according to Reagan, 
surely they could be trusted to enact their own welfare programs within their state and 
local governments. Similarly, by imbuing the American public with habits of enterprise
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and self-help, Reagan implicitly argued that responsibility for combating and overcoming 
undesirable circumstances lay with the individual. Reagan demonstrated that by refusing 
to be “great,” America’s poor bore responsibility for their failure to join the ranks of 
other Americans who were rising with the economic tide.
Reagan proposed a welfare reform program that would be headed not by the 
federal government, but by state and local agencies. Asen describes Reagan’s attitude: 
“The problem facing the country was that [the federal] government had transgressed its 
proper boundaries” (74). In his 1980 campaign, “Reagan sought to bring government 
under control by reducing or eliminating programs that wasted taxpayer money and by 
lowering tax rates that produced economic stagnation” (Asen 75). He was clear to 
advance the argument that successful welfare reform would have to come in a form more 
consistent with Nixon’s workfare rather than Johnson’s welfare. In The Politics o f  Social 
Welfare: The Collapse o f  the Centre and the Rise o f  the Right, author Alex Waddan 
maintains that, “Reagan very clearly denounced the social policies of the Great Society, 
accusing them of fostering dependency by moving away from the hand-up ethic and 
encouraging a hand-out ethic” (84). Reagan defined state run assistance as a hand up or 
aid out o f poverty, which contrasted sharply with the hand-out approach characteristic of 
federal aid generally, and the War on Poverty in particular. Reagan argued that under 
Johnson in the 1960s, “too many people became dependent on government payments and 
lost the moral strength that has always given the poor the determination to climb 
America’s ladder of opportunity” (1989 1). Here he reverts back to his trap metaphor 
that was integral to his 1987 speeches, in which he defined not poverty, but welfare as the 
trap, keeping America’s poor caught in a cycle of dependency. All the poor needed was a
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little determination, a little ambition, and less federal intervention to escape from the trap 
o f the welfare system. There is a clear and specific emphasis placed on the need for 
work. Reagan stated: “Now, all of us care about the poor, and all of us want to see the 
tragedy that is poverty ended. So, let’s get to work” (1987b 4). This statement comes 
after an argument in the same speech for reducing the number o f people on the welfare 
rolls. Reagan here advanced a subtle argument for a work-centered relief program.
Us vs. Them: Reagan’s Strategy of Dissociation 
All o f Reagan’s rhetorical strategies— attacking the War on Poverty, redefining 
welfare, and constructing the “truly needy”—allowed Reagan to utilize the divisive 
function o f identification. Burke explains this function: “Because to begin with 
‘identification’ is, by the same token, though roundabout, to confront the implications of 
division” (22). Further, Burke forwards, “Identification is compensatory to division” 
(182). As a persuader identifies with an audience, showing them what they are, s/he is 
simultaneously showing what they are not. “To be attracted to one view,” Gerard Hauser 
maintains, “implies that you forgo its opposing views” (214). Consistent with the 
analysis o f Zarefsky, Miller-Tutzauer, and Tutzauer, Schiappa defines this effort as 
dissociation, “an arguer’s effort to break up a previously unified idea into two concepts, 
one that will be positively valued by the target audience and one that will be negatively 
valued” (36). He explains that the two concepts are set up in philosophical pairs, “one of 
which is usually considered metaphysically, epistemologically, or ethically superior to 
the other” (36). To demonstrate previous efforts as unsuccessful, Reagan depicted the 
War on Poverty as a failure, as a joke, as unnecessary government expenditure. He
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created a reality for his audience, describing Johnson’s efforts as the inferior attempts of 
a well-meaning politician. In doing so, he cast his own initiatives as decidedly different 
from, and superior to, Johnson’s. To Reagan, the differences are black and white: one 
approach to poverty is good, one is bad; one helps the poor, one hurts the poor.
Similarly, Reagan’s redefinition o f welfare helped to solidify this dissociation. 
Here, the separation is emphasized as welfare is painted as undesirable, suffocating, and 
often reserved for the country’s laziest and least ambitious citizens. This strategy 
allowed Reagan to dissociate his audience’s concern for the poor from their financial 
interests. He defined part o f the poverty population as deserving, as “truly needy,” while 
a significant number lived frivolously, cheating the taxpayer. Reagan utilized 
dissociation to unite his audience against the “non-needy,” while still assuaging the 
collective conscience by pledging that the legitimate needs of the “truly needy” will be 
met. Through dissociation, Zarefsky, Miller-Tutzauer and Tutzauer conclude, not “only 
has Reagan riot repudiated the government’s historic commitment to help those in need, 
he has reaffirmed it—adding only the innocuous proviso that the need must be for real” 
(114).
Lastly, Reagan’s strategy o f dissociation is evident in his rhetoric of federal 
versus state governments. He left no question as to which is superior in terms of the 
welfare debate. He labeled state government as a creative outlet for welfare reform. He 
defined the federal government’s numerous welfare assistance programs as unnecessary 
interference. Michael Billig elaborates on the strategy of division: “The out-group—the 
implied ‘they’ who oppose ‘us’— are rhetorically depicted not merely as the opponents of 
‘us’ but also as the opponents o f universal principles with which ‘w e’ have identified
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ourselves and our audience” (238). Reagan juxtaposed the failing welfare system with its 
fiscally irresponsible initiatives and lazy recipients against a new state driven assistance 
program and the hard working Americans determined to rise out o f poverty on their own. 
He drew a clear line between two alternatives. But there was really no choice in this 
dichotomy. Either his audience was on the side o f a decentralized government committed 
to helping only the “truly needy,” or they supported the non-needy Americans 
taking advantage o f a bloated federal government.
The End Result
Patterson explains that while some liberals villanized Reagan unfairly, “critics 
were correct in perceiving the president as no friend of a generous public assistance state” 
(205). Reagan placed himself far away from the ideals of the Great Society not only in 
his rhetoric, but also in his policies. Davey explains, “Reagan’s first term saw an all-out 
assault on programs for the poor” (45). According to Patterson, Reagan’s alterations to 
welfare were so severe that “his proposed cuts in social programs were roughly twice as 
large as those ultimately accepted by Congress” (206). Iceland writes that the 1980s 
were overtaken by pessimistic attitudes that chipped away at the optimism of the 1960s 
concerning poverty and welfare reform. Evidence of this lies in Reagan’s treatment of 
both the federal budget and the states’ responsibilities. John Iceland notes, “Under 
Reagan, military budgets were expanded and taxes cut, as were some social programs. . .
. [Sjpending on others, such a s . . .  child care, unemployment insurance, food stamps, 
subsidized housing, public and mental health services, legal and was slashed” (125).
These cuts, according to Iceland, “coincided with perhaps the worst recession since the
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1930s”(125). Further, Iceland contends, during Reagan’s administration, unemployment 
and poverty rates leaped to their highest points in years.
Despite this data, Reagan still maintains credit for the “success” o f the programs, 
primarily because of a shift towards a decentralized approach to welfare reform. He 
began a radio address to the nation in August 1987 by declaring, “Americans always have 
cared about the less fortunate, and I’m sure it’ll deeply gladden the hearts of many o f you 
to know the kind of progress we’ve made during the past 6-1/2 years in helping the poor” 
(1987e 1). In an effort to prove the success of his programs, Reagan often touted the 
addition o f new jobs as a triumph o f his administration. However, according to Davey, 
the quality o f the jobs has been greatly inflated. He states, “It has been responsibly 
estimated that 44 percent of the new jobs created during Reagan’s two administrations 
paid poverty-level wages, compared to less than 20 percent of the new jobs that were 
created during the preceding two decades” (48). Even the new jobs the Reagan 
administration introduced added to the growing poverty population. Dallek describes 
Reagan’s politics as focusing on “shadow victories [that ignore] economic realities” (72). 
In a 1987 radio address Reagan characterized the success o f his administration by 
declaring, “We have between 4 and 6 million fewer low-income families on the Federal 
income tax rolls” (1987e 1). They may have been off of the welfare rolls, but that was no 
indication of their economic status; and as Dallek explains, many had moved from 
welfare roles to be counted among the working poor in yet another instance of the 
president rhetorically shrinking the safety net.
Dallek discusses the administration’s constructed reality. “The consequences of 
the reductions do not register clearly on Reagan and the advocates of his ideas because
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their attention focuses almost exclusively on the psychologically satisfying assault on 
government power. They either ignore or deny the results of their actions by 
thoughtlessly repeating unrealistic cliches about the role o f private, voluntary 
philanthropy” (90). All of this was justified, according to Reagan, because 
administration policy continued to provide for the country’s “truly needy.” Dallek 
interprets the evidence differently. He contends Reagan’s initiatives, “have done serious 
injury to domestic social programs and have caused significant suffering for the poor. 
But for Reagan, who denies these realities, actual political and economic changes are 
secondary to the fact that advocates o f ‘correct’ thinking or conservative ideas are in 
positions o f power, where they can speak for old values and honor their constituents’ 
views” (73). An integral part of Reagan’s constructed reality was altering public 
perception o f the current situation of the impoverished. By creating the “safety net,” 
Reagan forwarded his own position on welfare reform, regardless of the social and 
economic consequences.
Conclusion
The inherent ambiguity o f the term poverty is what allows it to be defined and 
redefined with every new administration. Poverty is not easily defined, not a matter of 
black and white. In America especially, a person often cannot be classified as poor by a 
cursory look. Poverty in America is hidden, it can be covered up, it has easy and readily 
available disguises. Michael Harrington argues that the poor are invisible. They are 
grouped together in slums or dispersed in the country, invisible from middle class 
suburbia. They are on the “other side of the tracks.” Even when a member of the lower
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class manages to enter the line o f sight of middle America, their problems are still 
invisible, hidden by their clothes. Clothing is a disguise for the poor— cheap clothing and 
hand me downs are not hard to come by. Harrington states, “it seems as if the affluent 
society had given out costumes to the poor so that they would not offend the rest of 
society with the sight o f rags” (5). The poor are also hidden behind nature—the rural 
poor are hidden by large corporate farms, the mountain poor are hidden behind the stately 
Appalachians, and the migrant poor are hidden by vast fields of plenty. The poor are 
politically invisible, they have no representation in the government. This vagueness and 
invisibility leaves poverty open to interpretation and political debate.
The Reagan presidency comprises a strong case in point o f constructed reality.
The president’s supporters paint a picture o f the Reagan years as an age o f economic 
prosperity and growth; as the tide rose, they argue, everyone rose with it. And in truth, 
for some Americans, the economy was flourishing, and people from many walks of life 
saw an improved quality of life. Research independent o f this perspective, however, 
constructs a reality in stark contrast to that o f luxurious yachts rising on the strong 
economic tide. Davey counters this notion, for instance, when he notes that changes “in 
the distribution o f income during the Reagan years would have had no impact on 
homelessness if, in fact, ‘the rising tide’ had raised all boats. But the relentless decrease 
in disposable income by those at the bottom of the income ladder, coupled with the 
shrinking stock of federally subsidized low-income housing, had to result in an increase 
in homelessness” (49). Imig adds that between “1979 and 1989 the income of the poorest 
fifth of the country actually decreased by 2.1 percent while that of the next poorest fifth 
remained virtually unchanged. Meanwhile, the upper middle class gained 10.6 percent in
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income and the richest fifth o f the country experienced income growth of 20.4 percent” 
(23). He adds: “A decade of redistribution has meant that the richest 2.5 million 
Americans, 1 percent o f the population, [had] nearly as much income as the poorest 40 
percent of the country” (24). Mike Davis reported that according the Congressional 
Budge Office, between 1980 and 1984, the poor “lost at least $23 billion in income and 
federal benefits, while high-income families have gained more than $35 billion” (234). 
Conservative commentator and pollster Kevin Phillips adds, “By the middle o f Reagan’s 
second term, official data had begun to show that America’s broadly defined ‘rich’—the 
top half of 1 percent o f the U.S. population—had never been richer” (8).
There was not only an increase in homelessness, but an increase in the poverty 
population, and an increase o f people who were in fact, “truly needy.” But Reagan 
constructed a different reality, a reality in which Americans could rely on their country 
for help, as long as that help was “deserved.” Reagan’s reality consisted o f moderately 
poor families who just needed a little push to get out o f poverty. In Reagan’s reality this 
push could help propel them up the economic ladder to middle class comforts and 
beyond.
Ironically, Reagan’s critical characterization o f the War on Poverty during a radio 
address in 1986, is in fact an accurate representation o f his own policies. He reported,
“In 1964 the famous War on Poverty was declared and a funny thing happened. Poverty, 
as measured by dependency, stopped shrinking and then actually began to grow worse. I 
guess you could say, poverty won the war. Poverty won in part because instead o f 
helping the poor, government programs ruptured the bonds holding poor families
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together” (2/15/86). Though Reagan’s approach to poverty was the polar opposite of 
Johnson’s the end result was the same—^poverty still won.
Though poverty was the clear victor, Reagan won the rhetorical battle. By 
redefining poverty, welfare and the Great Society programs, Reagan convinced the 
American people that the poverty problem was being taken care of. Fears were assuaged 
and consciences were soothed, but the financial realities remained unchanged. Murray 
Edelman observes that though “poverty and many other serious problems are obviously 
chronic, the language in which officials and the general public routinely discuss them 
focuses attention on the formal goal of overcoming them and masks many of the results 
of public policies” (141). He posits that this leads to “both the powerful and the 
powerless to accept their situations while permitting both to express their abhorrence of 
poverty and their dedication to reform” (142). The result, Edelman argues, is that the 
public continues to support the existing policies, “regardless of their empirical 
consequences” (142). The power o f definition and rhetorical construction o f reality can 
be clearly seen in Reagan’s poverty rhetoric. The American people accepted a reassuring 
reality, while blatantly ignoring the actual reality of America’s poor. Thus, it is the 
power of the rhetoric, of the reality, that was paramount. In this case, the actual results 
were inconsequential, it was less important that the issue was resolved, and more 
important that the public bought into, and was pacified by, Reagan’s reality.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSION: TWO INCOMPATIBLE 
REALITIES
The preceding chapters critically examined Lyndon Johnson’s anti-poverty 
rhetoric and Ronald Reagan’s welfare discourse. Johnson reinvigorated the welfare 
debate in the 1960s by declaring his War on Poverty. Seventeen years later, Reagan 
brought comfort to a country in economic turmoil by assuring Americans that the federal 
government would never desert the “truly needy.” The case studies reflect how two 
presidents constructed—or at least operated from— different social realities in addressing 
the government’s responsibility to the poor.
Current scholarship on theories o f poverty continues to address the divergent 
approaches reflected in the two presidential assessments of that responsibility. In 
American Poverty in a New Era o f  Reform, Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr., offers insight into the 
two views represented by Johnson and Reagan. Rodgers delineates two distinct theories 
of poverty, the cultural/behavioral and structural/economic. The cultural/behavioral 
interpretation holds that “the real cause of poverty is the behavior, values, and culture of 
the poor” (63). In Reagan’s rhetoric, the cultural/behavioral perspective is prominent. 
Reagan defines the reality of the poor as the result of personal apathy, or lack of personal 
drive. In Reagan’s reality, many o f the impoverished are that way by choice, not because 
they need assistance to rise out o f poverty. Likewise, the “cultural/behavioral approach,”
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Rodgers explains, “places responsibility for America’s poverty problem on the personal 
inadequacies o f the poor, welfare in general, or the design flaws of welfare programs” 
(67). In following with this approach, Reagan removed responsibility from the federal 
government, and deflected it onto the poor themselves. As discussed earlier, Reagan 
reinforced the perception o f welfare as a “dirty” word, and its recipients as indolent and 
apathetic. He then unified his audience under the “American values” of hard work and 
determination. Historian James T. Patterson notes the significance o f this tactic when he 
observes, “Reagan’s appeal rested ultimately on his celebration of time-honored 
American values—the work ethic, rugged individualism, and hostility to public 
‘handouts’” (207). Within the eultural/behavioral approach, a solid work ethic coupled 
with determination would be all the hand-up an American would need to escape from 
poverty.
As previously discussed, Reagan trivialized the War on Poverty, often using it as 
an example of misguided thinking by the Johnson administration. Reagan acknowledged 
the challenges that the cycle o f poverty posed to welfare programs. But instead of 
government aid being a solution to the problem, Reagan argued, welfare only ensured 
that people remained eaught in the vieious cyele. The president’s discourse reinforced a 
reality in which the poor eonsisted of drunken vagrants, promiscuous women, and 
juvenile delinquents. These harsh substantive descriptions were countered with 
sympathetic tones, designed to demonstrate his compassion for the “truly needy.”
“Journalists and politicians,” wrote the late scholar of presidential rhetoric, 
Theodore Windt, “frequently wish to draw metaphysical distinctions between rhetoric 
and reality, as if  the former is false or misleading, while the latter is true and accurate”
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(xvii). But as we have seen, the former is often the more important of the two. The facts 
of poverty during the Reagan administration are clear. Despite “three recessions,” 
Rodgers notes, “the rate o f poverty declined significantly during the 1960s and 1970s.” 
But by “the early 1980s,” he continues, “the rate o f poverty was increasing” (27). 
Historians also note that Reagan’s tax Cuts had serious long-term consequences. 
“Reagan’s belief was the tax cuts would stimulate the eeonomy, producing more, not less, 
revenues. Time proved Reagan wrong. The result of Reagan’s tax and spending policies 
was the largest deficits in the nation’s history” (Rodgers 85). The reality proved to be 
quite different from Reagan’s rhetoric.
Reagan insisted that the fundamental American values o f hard work and 
dedication should be enough to boost people out o f the culture of poverty, without 
requiring the assistance o f federal welfare programs. Here, again, redefinition was 
central to his argument. “By early 1985 nearly 14 million children (22 percent o f all 
American children) lived in families with incomes below the poverty line. They made up 
nearly 40 percent of the total poverty population” (Patterson 212). It would be difficult to 
argue that this large portion o f the poverty population could change their situation 
through increased ambition and a stronger work ethie. Nevertheless, Reagan continued to 
assure his national audience that his administration was committed to assisting those who 
“truly” could not help themselves. As Rodgers notes, such assurances were not 
consistent with the data: “Poverty increased dramatically during the Reagan years, but 
Reagan argued that welfare programs were to blame, not his economic polices” (85). 
Rhetoric allowed the president to describe a social reality in which welfare programs only 
exacerbated the cycle of poverty, the social ill they were ostensibly designed to combat.
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In contrast to the cultural/behavioral view, structural or economic theories 
“usually contain some behavioral component, but argue the precipitating cause of poverty 
is a lack of equal opportunities (high unemployment or sub employment), educational 
systems that disadvantage the poor, or discrimination in its various forms” (Rodgers 63). 
Analyzing Johnson’s rhetoric, a clear structural/economic theme emerges. Johnson 
championed his welfare programs as instruments essential to the destruction of the cycle 
of poverty. He emphasized members o f the poor population who wanted to work and to 
succeed, but could not because o f physical, mental, or economic constraints. The only 
solution, Johnson insisted, was front-line government intervention.
Johnson capitalized on the rediscovery of poverty in the early 1960s, which 
fostered public discussion of an often hidden problem. Time magazine, for instance, 
featured an article in 1965 that depicted the devastating truth o f America’s poor. The 
article offered a frank discussion that put poverty in a new perspective:
The reality of the new poverty lies in its contrast to U.S. affluence, and it 
is heightened by the constant, often self-congratulatory talk about that 
affluence.. . .  It is the poverty o f people who have a refrigerator, assert 
their right to own a TV set, may genuinely need a car, should visit a 
dentist. Even if this poverty is not like any earlier poverty or the poverty 
o f much of the rest o f the world, it is worth declaring a war on. (“The 
Poor” 1)
But even today, over 40 years later, the war has yet to be won. As with Reagan, here the 
rhetoric and the reality are not compatible. The rhetoric o f the War on Poverty promised 
an attack on one of the country’s most debilitating problems, an attack that assured
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complete and total victory. This resulted in an increased skepticism of the possible 
success of the initiatives. “By the time the war on poverty lost its political glamour, its 
limitations had intensified the country’s doubts about the ability of experts to diagnose, 
much less cure, the ills o f the poor” (Patterson 122). Johnson’s rhetoric promised an 
impossible feat, thereby all but guaranteeing inconsistencies between rhetoric and reality.
The transition from Johnson’s War on Poverty to Reagan’s Safety Net, might be 
traced to Richard Nixon’s discourse on poverty and welfare. In his “Address to the 
Nation on Domestic Programs,” delivered August 8, 1969, Nixon emphasized the 
responsibilities of the poor in fighting poverty, the government’s role in assisting the 
poor, and how the two must work together. Nixon stated that his plans for reform aimed 
“at getting everyone able to work off welfare rolls and onto payrolls” (2). This emphasis 
on self-sufficiency continued throughout his speech. Nixon paved the way for Reagan to 
criticize the War on Poverty by cataloging the failures o f past administrations, calling 
Washington “a bureaucratic monstrosity, cumbersome, unresponsive, ineffective” (1).
His most severe criticism came in his discussion o f the country’s poor. “Nowhere,” he 
asserted, “has the failure o f government been more tragically apparent than in its efforts 
to help the poor and especially in its system of public welfare” (1). Nixon did not 
completely reject Johnson’s philosophies; instead, he outlined the importance of a 
working welfare system: “The present system often makes it possible to receive more 
money on welfare than on a low-paying job” (3). This he stated, is “morally wrong” for a 
“family that is working to try to make ends meet to receive less than a family across the 
street on welfare” (3). Nixon laid the foundation for Reagan to shift away from a reality 
of a culture o f poverty, and towards a reality o f a debilitating welfare system.
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That Nixon’s rhetoric served as a precursor to Reagan’s argument is evident, 
further, in Patterson’s analysis of a key difference in Johnson’s and Reagan’s attitudes. 
He writes that the “goal o f social policy in the Johnson years had started with the 
question, ‘How can we help the poor?’ Reagan, in contrast, tended to ask, ‘How can we 
cut costs, and how can we get people to work?”’ (206). The differences in the constructed 
realities complement Rodgers’ research, specifically his observation that “conservatives 
favor cultural/behavioral arguments, while moderates and liberals usually stress 
structural/economic explanations that contain a behavioral component” (63). Regardless 
o f the original positions o f the presidents, the end result was the same. Both presidents’ 
rhetoric fell significantly short o f the constructed reality.
Presidential Rhetoric: the Power of Definition 
Theodore Windt described the importance and necessity of strong presidential 
rhetoric both for issues o f public policy and for the sustaining government. “It can be 
persuasively argued,” he writes, “that without this presidential role as opinion leader for 
the nation, the Republic would actually be in grave danger. If the presidency had 
remained passive and inarticulate, the vaunted dispersion of the power to govern might 
long since have destroyed the system itse lf’ (7). It has long since been accepted that 
presidential rhetoric is an essential element of the office, and Americans now expect to 
hear speeches from their president on a constant basis. In contrast to the nineteenth 
century, it is no longer surprising to hear a subject like poverty discussed authoritatively 
by the president.
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David Zarefsky explains that presidential rhetoric includes “decisions about how 
to explain ambiguous situations, so that they may be taken as evidence for one’s point of 
view rather than the opposite” (5). As previously discussed, defining reality was critical 
to the acceptance of the presidents’ policies. Johnson described the ambiguous situation 
of poverty as an enemy that threatened America’s economy, population, and children. By 
advancing this definition of poverty as a vicious cycle, Johnson dismissed the theory that 
poverty was the result of laziness.
Reagan, in contrast, chose to downsize the poverty population, labeling the larger 
segment o f the poor as taking advantage of a benevolent government, and deeming only a 
small segment of the poor as worthy o f tax payer dollars. In doing so, Reagan 
contradicted Johnson’s arguments that poverty was a nation-wide epidemic; he defined it 
instead as a localized, minor problem. Both presidents delineated a clear enemy. 
Johnson’s enemy was poverty, Reagan’s was the laziness and apathy that seemed to 
plague America’s poor.
The rhetoric o f poverty and welfare reform offers a case study in the power of 
presidential rhetoric. Murray Edelman observes, “Though poverty and many other 
serious problems are obviously chronic, the language in which officials and the general 
public routinely discuss them focuses attention on the formal goal of overcoming them 
and masks many of the results o f public policies” (141). The rhetoric of Johnson and 
Reagan alike focused on the goal of overcoming poverty. Johnson championed a full- 
fledged War on Poverty, a lofty goal that scholars agree contributed to the ultimate 
failure of his efforts to help the poor.
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Zarefsky describes Johnson’s fatal flaw in the War on Poverty: “His programs 
were measured not against what the conditions had been before he began but against the 
vision which his own rhetoric had proclaimed” (204). It is arguably impossible for any 
single administration to destroy completely the “enemy” of poverty, but Johnson focused 
his rhetoric exclusively on this idea. As a consequence, Zarefsky writes, Johnson faced 
an intractable dilemma: “Excessively forceful symbolic choices could not be sustained in 
incrementalist action, but forceful symbolic choices might well have been ineffective in 
arousing a latent public in the first place” (204). Had Johnson not taken this approach, it 
likely would have been even more difficult to gain public interest; yet by declaring war, 
Johnson ultimately assured his own failure. In the end, the progress made in combating 
poverty was deemed insignificant when compared to the original goal.
In contrast to the shortcomings of LBJ’s strategy and tactics, Reagan aimed in his 
rhetoric to convince the American people that the poverty problem was not a national 
epidemic, but a localized nuisance that could be dealt with swiftly, 'without substantial 
federal government intervention. To gain the support of his audience, Reagan’s rhetoric 
ensured that the “truly needy” would never fall through an essential “safety net.” This 
designation rhetorically minimized the poverty problem and dismissed millions of 
Americans in need.
The War Continues: Poverty in Contemporary 
Political Rhetoric
Scholarship in presidential rhetoric remains a vibrant and fruitful pursuit. Within 
that pursuit, it remains important to continue to develop sustained analyses of poverty and
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welfare discourse within the genre o f presidential communication. Recent statistics reveal 
the necessity for such study. Rodgers explains: “In 2003, the federal government 
estimated that almost 36 million Americans were poor, over 12 percent of the population. 
To put this number in perspective, the collective poverty population in 2003 was almost 
as large as the total population o f California, twice the size of the population o f Florida, 
and several million larger than the entire population of Canada” (4). That number 
increased in 2005; the estimate grew to 37 million Americans, or close to 13% of the 
population (Nilsen 5). Most recently, in 2007 Thomas J. Billitteri, Director of 
Communications for the Aspen Institute, wrote that despite “a relatively stable economy, 
an overhaul of the welfare system a decade ago and billions spent on programs for the 
needy, poverty remains pervasive and intractable across the nation” (2). In addition to 
the clear need to analyze the power of definition in presidential speech, two principles 
urge the study of rhetoric concerning poverty in the early twenty-first century.
First, political pundits agree that the issue o f poverty and welfare reform is 
prevalent in campaign rhetoric for the 2008 election. According to Billitteri, in
the 2008 presidential race. Sen. Hillary Clinton, D-N.Y., has accused the Bush 
administration of making the middle class and working families into “invisible 
Americans,” while Sen. Barack Obama, D-IIL, alluding to his work as a 
community organizer in Chicago, has said poverty “is the cause that led me to a 
life of public service.” Former Sen. John Edwards, D-N.C., has staked his 
campaign on the poverty issue, calling it “the great moral issue of our time.” (4). 
Candidate debates, campaign oratory, media coverage, and public discussion is highly 
likely to continue to attend to poverty as a political issue. As such, rhetorical critics must
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be prepared to turn a critical eye to the way this new group of presidential hopefuls define 
the problem, construct competing realities, and pledge to create workable remedies.
Second, scholars across many disciplines agree that developing and implementing 
policies that curtail poverty will have lasting effects on the American economy. Rodgers 
writes, for instance, that effective “social welfare programs should also be able to further 
lower the teen out-of-wedlock birthrate, improve child-support levels, lower the size of 
the next poverty generation through pre-school and after school programs, and even 
reduce the size and cost o f serious social problems such as crime” (215). In remarks 
before the House of Representative Committee on Ways and Means, Chairman Sigurd 
Nilsen agreed. “Economic theory,” he noted, “predicts that low wages or unemployment 
makes crime more attractive, even with the risks o f arrest and incarceration, because of 
lower returns to an individual through legal activities” (15).
The data suggest, then, that Michael Harrington’s theory of the cycle of poverty 
holds true four decades after its introduction. Even research critical of some recipients of 
public assistance acknowledges that not all those who receive support are undeserving. 
David K. Shipler, for instance, reports “finding poor folks whose own behavior has not 
contributed something to their hardships: having babies out of wedlock, dropping out of 
school, doing drugs, showing up late to work or not at all” But, he adds, “it is also 
difficult to find behavior that has not somehow been inherited from the legacy o f being 
badly parented, badly schooled, badly housed in neighborhoods where the horizon of 
possibility is so near at hand that it blinds people to their own potential for imagination”
(15). Nilsen confirms Shipler’s conclusion when he notes that the “relationship between 
poverty and outcomes for individuals is complex, in part because most variables, like
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health status, can be both a cause and a result of poverty” (8). Before the poverty 
problem can be solved, there needs to be agreement about its causes, effects and victims. 
As the discussion continues, and as poverty continues to be ambiguous, communication 
scholars must persist in analyzing how the terms o f the debate are framed and argued.
It is clear that contemporary scholars and politicians are still engaged in defining 
what Schiappa refers to as “facts o f essence” (6). As discussed in chapter one, facts of 
essence are concerned with discovering what something “is in reality” (6). As advances 
in technology and society are made, poverty becomes increasingly ambiguous. In The 
Other America Harrington discussed ways that the poor become invisible, they hide in 
separated areas, but also in ways like clothing. This true even more so today. With 
major discount retailers like Wal-Mart, Kohl’s, and Ross growing in popularity, it is easy 
for the members o f the culture o f poverty to disguise their economic state. Even items 
like pre-paid cell phones can help the poor become hidden among their middle and upper 
class counterparts. The definition of poverty, a seemingly simple fact of essence, has not 
yet reached a consensus among Americans. Both Johnson and Reagan presented 
different definitions for poverty and welfare reform, but decades later, the topic is still 
intensely debated. Therefore, the simple question of definition is still left unanswered— 
what is poverty?
Conclusion
Developing a clear understanding o f the power o f definition in presidential 
rhetoric is meritorious on its own terms. Understanding how acceptance of the terms of 
debate predisposes an outcome— or, at least, establishes favorable grounds for one
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participant over others— increases even further the importance o f studying the 
relationships between rhetorical definition and the construction of social realities.
Rodgers emphasizes that agreement on the terms o f debate about poverty is essential to 
consensus about the causes o f poverty; and the absence o f such consensus impedes 
movement toward problem solving and policy making. He writes: “[Ejven being aware of 
the diversity and complexity o f poverty and the use of welfare by the poor will not solve 
all analytical problems. Fashioning public policies to solve poverty would be easier if  
there was agreement about the causes o f poverty” (58). It is not enough to acknowledge 
that poverty exists; that acknowledgement must go further to reach a unified reality of 
what causes people to enter into, and remain, in poverty. Here is where general 
opportunities lie for further study. How are contemporary presidential hopefuls defining 
this seemingly never-ending problem? Is it possible for discussants to come together to 
construct a reality o f poverty that will allow for its total elimination? With the growing 
prosperity o f America’s upper-class, are the poor becoming increasingly invisible? And 
at the more specific level, one topic that merits criticism is the rhetoric o f John Edwards. 
His campaign is already being compared to Johnson’s War on Poverty. Is Edwards 
making the same mistakes? By vowing to eliminate poverty in the next 30 years, is he 
setting America up to fail?
An area o f communication studies that has been thriving recently is analysis of 
the rhetoric of terrorism, specifically after the attacks on September 11. A simple subject 
search for this topic will yield abundant results. A similar search of analyses of poverty 
rhetoric, however, will result in a smaller body of work. Not discounting the scholarship 
on terrorism, the rhetorical discussion o f poverty and welfare rhetoric must be expanded
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to explain fully the way politicians, both past and present, have depicted poverty’s 
victims and possible solutions. This will increase our knowledge of presidential rhetoric, 
the social construction o f reality, and a segment o f the population that only continues to 
grow.
Much research has already been done on the rhetorical presidency. Research on 
its origin, evolution, exemplary practitioners is substantial and growing. Other 
discussions could further explore the interrelationships between the power o f definition 
and presidential rhetoric. As technology and society evolve, we are faced with more 
issues of definition. Stem cell research, same sex marriage, cloning, and genetic 
selection are only a few examples o f opportunities presidents and other political 
advocates have— and will continue to have—to construct a reality based largely on 
definitions o f key terms. In the process of defining terms, Shipler reminds us, political 
leaders may establish grounds from which solutions to urgent problems might emerge. 
“You cannot solve a problem without defining it,” he contends, “and if you don’t allow 
yourself a compete definition, you will never approach a thorough solution” (15).
Lyndon Johnson and Ronald Reagan both understood the importance o f defining 
“poverty” and “welfare reform,” respectively; but neither succeeded in generating 
concrete policy that matched their rhetorical tactics. With 37-million Americans now 
counted among the poor, the search for leaders who might model the presidents’ 
accomplishments, while concurrently learning from their mistakes, could not be more 
urgent.
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